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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE SOVEREIGNTY -

FEDERAL RAILWAY
LABOR ACT IMPERMISSIBLY INTERFERES WIT INTEGRAL STATE
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION IN PROVIDING INTRASTATE
COMMUTER RAIL TRANSPORTATION.

United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. (2d Cir. 1980)
On December 7, 1979, the United Transportation Union (the UTU)

I

instituted an action on behalf of its members against their employer,

the Long Island Rail Road Company (LIRR) and its parent agency, the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority (the MTA),2 seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief from application of the New York Public Employee's
Fair Employment Act (the Taylor Law) which prohibits strikes by
public employees.3 The next day, on December 8, 1979, the UTU employees, invoking their right to self-help 4 under the federal Railway
1. United Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. (UTU v. LIRR),
634 F.2d 19, 21 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981). The
UTU is one of seven collective bargaining representatives for operators and
train employees of the Long Island Rail Road Company. 634 F.2d at 21.
2. 634 F.2d at 21. The LIRR is one of several commuter rail carriers
serving the metropolitan New York City area. Id. at 20. Owned and operated
since 1966 by the state agency known as the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority of New York (the MTA), the wholly intrastate carrier transports
approximately 250,000 commuters each work day and also handles a small
number of freight interchanges with several interstate rail carriers. Id. Freight
revenues in 1979 exceeded $12.1 million, but constituted only a fraction of the

LIRR's total revenues of approximately $300 million. Id. at 20-21.

For a dis-

cussion on the significance of these statistics, see note 15 and accompanying
text infra. For a criticism of the UTU court's reliance on these statistics, see
note 155 and accompanying text infra.
3. 634 F.2d at 21. The-Taylor Law provides, in pertinent part: "No
public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and no
public employee or employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage or
condone a strike." N.Y. CIv. SERv. LAW §210(1) (McKinney 1973). Apparently, the UTU instituted the principal action as a precautionary measure
to ensure its right to strike once it became clear that the collective bargaining
procedures specified in the federal Railway Labor Act (the RLA) were not
going to produce a satisfactory agreement in a 16 month old contract deadlock
between the LIRR and the unions representing the LIRR employees. 634
F.2d at 21. See Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1976); note 5 and
accompanying text infra. See also Long Island R.R. v. United Transp. Union,
484 F. Supp. 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The UTU sought: 1) a declaratory judgment that the parties were subject to the RLA, and thus were entitled to resort

to self-help once the RLA's procedures designed to produce agreement had
been exhausted; and 2) injunctive relief against any possible prosecution in a

state court to enforce the Taylor Law. 634 F.2d at 21.
4. The ability to engage in labor strikes is commonly referred to as the
right to self-help, i.e., self-help against a particular labor condition. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 296 (1976).

(1041)
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Labor Act (the RLA),5 struck the LIRR.O Following a return to work
order by President Carter,7 the union members ended their strike,8 and
the UTU again sought federal injunctive relief against the LIRR's
invocation of the Taylor Law. 9 Contemporaneously, the LIRR brought
a state court action to enforce the Taylor law and enjoin the UTU
strike.' 0 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York denied the UTU's request for preliminary relief," and one
day later the New York State Supreme Court for New York County
granted the LIRR's request for a temporary restraining order against
the UTU strike.12 Subsequently,18 the federal district court granted the
UTU's request for summary judgment against enforcement, of the Taylor Law 14 by holding that the self-help provisions of the RLA super5. Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, 44 Stat. 577 (codified at 45
U.SC. §§ 151-88 (1976)). The RLA provides a comprehensive system of mediation and arbitration procedures designed to ensure an orderly and speedy
resolution of national labor disputes involving railroad employees. Id. at
§§ 152-60. Although not specifically guaranteed by the RLA, employees are
permitted to engage in self-help once these procedures have been exhausted.
See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S.
369, 378-82 (1969).
6. 634 F.2d at 21.

7. Id. On December 14, 1979, a 60 day "cooling off" period was imposed
on the unions by the establishment of a Presidential Emergency Board pursuant to § 10 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1976). See Exec. Order No. 12182,
44 Fed. Reg. 74785 (1979). It is unclear whether the LIRR, the MTA, or
both invoked this provision. See UTU v. LIRR, 509 F. Supp. 1300, 1304-05
(E.D.N.Y. 1980). For a discussion of the district court's presumption that the
MTA in fact invoked the RLA's collective bargaining procedures, see note 15
and accompanying text infra.
8. 634 F.2d at 21. The "cooling off" period triggered by the President's
action contemplates that strikes are to be strictly proscribed throughout its
duration. See 45 U.S.C. § 160 (1976).
9. 634 F.2d at 21. The UTU's original request for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed prior to its December 8, 1979 strike. See note 3 supra.
This second request sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary
relief after the LIRR altered its corporate structure to facilitate use of the
Taylor Law. See 634 F.2d at 21. Initially, the LIRR moved to dismiss the
UTU action on the grounds that because the railroad was not a "public
benefit corporation," its employees were not "public employees" subject to the
anti-strike provision of the Taylor Law. 509 F. Supp. at 1302. See N.Y.
PUBLIC AUTHORITIEs LAW § 1265(9)(a) (McKinney 1970); N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw

§ 201(7)(A) (McKinney 1973).

Subsequent to this motion but before it was
argued, the LIRR was reincorporated as a public benefit corporation thereby
subjecting its employees to the Taylor Law. 634 F.2d at 21.
10. See Long Island R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 103 Misc. 2d 220, 425
N.Y.S.2d 518 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
11. 509 F. Supp. at 1309.
12. 634 F.2d at 21 n.4. See Long Island R.R. v. United Transp. Union,
103 Misc. 2d at 222, 425 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
13. 634 F.2d at 21 n.4. During the pendency of these actions both the
UTU and the LIRR instituted several "procedural sideshows" as each attempted to thwart the other's efforts to secure a favorable judgment. Id. See
-509 F. Supp. at 1303 n.3; UTU v. LIRR, 484 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
14. 509 F. Supp. at 1309.
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-ceded the state statute and, therefore, that UTU members were permitted
to strike.15
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the RLA impermissibly interferes with the
state's ability to structure employer-employee relationships in its role as
sole provider of intrastate commuter rail transportation as an essential
15. Id. The district court found that because the LIRR exchanged freight
with several interstate rail carriers, it was by its own terms subject to the RLA.
Id. at 1303-04. Although the LIRR maintained that its freight revenues were
miniscule when compared to revenues from its commuter operations - $12
million or approximately 4% of 1979 revenues - the district court interpreted
these figures as indicating that the LIRR and its freight operations supplies a
critical and "necessary physical link with other railroads in the movement of
Id. at 1304, quoting Long Island
,a heavy volume of interstate freight .......
R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 185 F. Supp. 356, 357 (E.D.N.Y. 1960).
The district court contended that this finding was buttressed by a recent de,cision by the Interstate Commerce Commission in which the ICC, although
dealing with another MTA subsidiary, specifically found that the LIRR is a
carrier subject to the RLA. 509 F. Supp. at 1303. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth., Finance Docket
No. 29011 (Nov. 8, 1979). For a discussion of the significance of the district

court's reliance upon the decision by the ICC, see note 94 infra.
More significantly, the district court reasoned that the LIRR should be
subject to the RLA because of its historic perception of itself as a "carrier" as
defined by several federal enactments. 509 F. Supp. at 1304-05. By routinely
filing reports required by the ICC of all interstate carriers, see 49 U.S.C. § 1
(1976); affording its employees full benefits under the Railroad Retirement
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 228a (1976), and the Federal Employees Liability Act, 45

U.S.C. § 51 (1976); and affirmatively seeking in the past and within the principal action to utilize the collective bargaining and mediation procedures of
the RLA, the district court determined that "the Railroad can [not] now unilaterally change its essential character within this context by the simple expedient of reorganizing its corporate structure under state law" so as to invoke
.the anti-strike provisions of the Taylor Law. 509 F. Supp. at 1305. See note
9 supra.
Furthermore, the district court indicated that, having found that the LIRR

is a carrier within the meaning of the RLA, the conclusion that its employees
were entitled to strike in violation of the Taylor Law was controlled by its
prior decision on the identical issue with regard to another of the MTA's
commuter rail lines. 509 F. Supp. at 1305, citing Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. 100 L.R.R.M. 3154
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1979). Following this prior decision, the district court
reasoned that, even discounting the interstate freight which the LIRR handled,
the provision of intrastate commuter rail service is not sufficiently akin to such
essential state functions as fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public
health and parks or recreation which are immune from federal commerce clause
legislation such as the RLA. 509 F. Supp. at 1306 n.4, citing Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth., 100
L.R.R.M. 3154 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1979) (quoting from National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976)). For a discussion of National League
of Cities v. Usery, see notes 67-82 and accompanying text infra.

In view of its finding that intrastate commuter rail transportation is not

immune from the RLA, the district court issued a permanent injunction restraining the LIRR and the MTA from prosecuting any state court action
against the UTU under the Taylor Law. 509 F. Supp. at 1309. However, the

-district court also enjoined the UTU from engaging in their strike, pending
determination of any appeal taken by the LIRR to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Id.
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F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 3107 (1981).
The history of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the tenth amendment 1 6 has shifted over time. 17 Controversy over the
16. The tenth amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend X.
17. Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) with
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). For a discussion of these shifts, see
notes 18-82 and accompanying text infra.
The tenth amendment and its relation to the constitutional system of
federalism has been the subject of extensive analysis. See, e.g., M. REAGAN,
THE NEW FEDERALISM (1972); K. WHEARE, FEDERALISM (1903), Manson, Federalism: Historic Questions & Contemporary Meanings - The Role of the
Court in FEDERALISM - INFINITE VARIETY IN THEORY AND PRACrICE (V. Earle
ed. 1968); Friendly, Federalism: A Forward, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1019-21 (1977);
Percy, National League of Cities v. Usey: The Tenth Amendment Is Alive
and Doing Well, 51 TUL. L. REv. 95, 98 (1976); Stenburg, Federalism in Transition 1959-79, 7 CURRENT MUNICIPAL PROB. 137, 150-51 (1980); Trippett, States
Rights and Other Myths, TIME, Feb. 9, 1981, at 97-98.

According to one government inquiry, federalism has been defined as embracing the following elements:
(1)as in all federations, the union of several autonomous political
entities, or 'states,' for common purposes;
(2) the division of legislative powers between a "National Government" on the one hand, and constituent "States" on the other,
which division is governed by the rule that the former is a "government of enumerated powers" while the latter are governments of
"residual powers;"
(3) the direct operation, for the most part, of each of these centers of
government, within its assigned sphere, upon all persons and
property within its territorial limits;

(4) the provision of each center with the complete apparatus of law
enforcement, both executive and judicial;
(5) the supremacy of the "National Government" within its assigned
sphere over any conflicting assertion of "State"
(6) dual citizenship.
CONGRESSIONAL

RESEARCH

SERVICE,

CONSTITUTION

OF

THE

power;
UNITED

[and]
STATES

OF

No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d SessXVIII (1973). In contrast, another commentator has observed that:
Conventional treatment ...of American federalism ...emphasizes the
theme of unity without uniformity, that is, the use of federalism in
uniting states more effectively and in more disciplined fashion than a
confederacy, at the same time leaving to the member states a broad,
imprecisely defined area of authority.
AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc.

Earle, ed., supra, at Preface (emphasis added). Yet another commentator has,

stated that conventional doctrine on federalism and the relationship between
the national and state governments has undergone a marked change during
the 1970s, largely as a result of the population's recognition that government
has become burdened by its size and complexity. Stenburg, supra, at 150-51.
As a result of this change in thought, there has developed a "new federalism,"
the principal themes of which include:
- a belief that "big government" and large centralized bureaucracies
remote from the people and the sources of problems [are] undesirable, and that the best government is that "closest to the people."
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distribution of federal and state power first reached the Supreme Court
in McCulloch v. Maryland 18 where the Court invalidated a state government's taxation of a federal instrumentality. 19 Relying on the
"necessary and proper clause," 20 Chief Justice Marshall rejected the
argument that the framers of the Constitution had intended this clause
to operate as a limitation on the enumerated powers of the national
government, finding, instead, that these words conferred on Congress a
broad authority to pursue any end which could reasonably be seen as
serving the general welfare of the United States.21 In reaching this
conclusion, Marshall articulated a strong theory of federalism,22 and
-

-

-

-

a feeling that Washington alone cannot accurately diagnose or solve
all or even most domestic problems, and that a loss of public faith
in the federal government [has] occurred due to a gap between
promise and performance;
an assumption that the appropriate roles and functional assignments
of different levels of government could be identified, and that subnational units [will] be willing to assume their proper responsibilities;
a view that the structure of the federal executive branch need[s] to
be overhauled, its bureaucracy cut down to size and made more accountable, and its personnel put "on tap, but not on top;" and
an awareness that the degree to which functions could be tuned
[sic] back to the states and localities would be conditioned by their
willingness and capacity to perform and that federal tax revenues
should be used for the purpose of strengthening the capabilities of
state and general purpose local governments.

Id.
18. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
19. Id. at 437. The landmark opinion by Chief Justice Marshall discussed
two related issues: 1) whether the federal government has the power to in-corporate a national bank; and 2) whether the State of Maryland could, without violating the Constitution, impose a discriminatory tax on that bank. Id.
at 401, 425. The latter question is credited with giving rise to the doctrine of
intergovernmental immunity from taxation. For a discussion of this doctrine
and its relevance to the principal case, see notes 47-49 and accompanying
text infra.
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. This clause provides that Congress has
the power: "To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in Department or Officer thereof." Id.
21. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 412-19. Accordingly, Marshall stated: "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. Specifically rejected was the argument, advanced by
the State of Maryland, that Congress is empowered to make only those laws
,absolutely necessary to the execution of an enumerated power. Id. at 412-15.
22. See Manson, supra note 17, at 8-22. Marshall's theory of a strong
federal government was characteristic of the political doctrine advanced by the
"Federalist" political party of the early nineteenth century. Id. In contrast
to the Federalist view that the national welfare could best be served by a
strong central government, the "Anti-Federalist" doctrine argued for a confederate system composed of separate and sovereign states loosely tied together.
.Id. For a modern example of this tension, see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
.37, 43-45 (1971) (limitation on federal intervention into state court proceedings).
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contended that the tenth amendment expresses no additional limitation
on the power of the national government beyond the Constitution's implicit requirement that the central government's exercises of its delegated
23
powers be reasonable in their effect.
Although the Marshall Court continued to expand the role of congressional power,2 4 it was not until Gibbons v. Ogden 25 that the Court
sustained federal legislation under the commerce clause. 26 After defining
that power to permit regulation of any "intercourse" among the several
states,27 Marshall rejected the weak theory of federalism which dictates
that state and national powers are presumed to be concurrent in any
area which is not exclusively and expressly granted by the Constitution
to Congress. 28 According to Marshall, by declaring the supremacy not
only of the Constitution but of all laws enacted pursuant to its proviSee generally Cowen, What is Left of the Tenth Amendment?, 39 N.C. L. REV.
154, 156-58 (1961); Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a
National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both," 86 YALE

L.J. 1273 (1977); and historical sources discussed in Comment, Theories of
Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1018-20 (1966).
P. Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, in FEDERALISM, MATURE

See also,
AND EMER-

384 (A. Macmahon ed. 1962).
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406-07. Chief Justice Marshall stressed the fact
that the tenth amendment speaks in terms of "powers not delegated" rather
GENT

that "powers not expressly delegated," as had been the phrasing in the Articles.
of Confederation. Id. According to Marshall, this change in terminology
reflected the fact that "[t]he men who drew and adopted this amendment had
experienced the embarrassments resulting from the insertion of this word .....
and probably omitted it to avoid those embarrassments." Id. Marshall contended that it is the constitution itself, rather than the tenth amendment
acting alone, which limits the power of the federal government. Id. at 406.
See Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth
Amendment?, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 161, 168-69.
24. See, e.g., Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816). But see Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
25. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
26. Id. at 211. The commerce clause grants to Congress the power "To,
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and
with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Justice Frankfurter
has referred to the commerce clause as "the chief source of . . . adjudications
regarding federalism."

F.

FRANKFURTER,

THE COMMERCE

CLAUSE UNDER

MAR-

67 (1937). For Marshall's only other opinions dealing with the impact of the commerce clause on state regulation, see Wilson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (state power to regulate interstate commerce under police power in absence of federal enactment);
Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) (state power to tax foreign,
commerce).
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97. Marshall defined commerce as "intercourse" between the states, and stated that by necessity "[t]he power of congress, then, whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the several states." Id. at 196.
SHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE

28. Id. at 197-98, 210.

Marshall declined to view the federal and state

governments as equal sovereigns.

Id.
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the framers had intended that state sovereignty be subordinate
to the legitimate exercise of national power.30
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, the Supreme Court departed from Chief Justice Marshall's theories on national
power, 31 and in several cases actually restruck the balance of federal
and state power so as to give greater recognition to state's rights and
powers than Marshall had been willing to admit. 32 Decisions within
this period pursued one of two avenues of constitutional interpretation:
either they obviated the entire issue of federal supremacy by characterizing state legislation as an exercise of inherent state police power 3 or
they recast the tenth amendment wholly in terms of an independent or
additional check on the exercise of a delegated national power.3 4 Draw-

:sions,29

29. Id. at 210. The Supremacy Clause of the Constiution provides:
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
30. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210. As long as the exercise of Congress' power
was legitimate, Marshall considered it irrelevant that it encroached upon state
sovereignty. Id. Finding no need for a constitutional limitation, Marshall
reasoned that the electoral power of the populace is the "strongest restraint"
on Congress' exercise of its delegated powers. Id. at 197. See also Corwin,
THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGHTS 124 (1936).
31. See, e.g., Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (unconstitutional for Congress to attempt to bar slavery from territories or states); Cooley
v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (unconstitutional for Congress to regulate navigation in such a way as impairs power of state to control
intrastate pilotage); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (guaranty
clause of federal constitution insufficient authority for judicial invalidation of
state action denying representative government). See generally 2 C. WARREN,
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 275-312 (1923).
32. See notes 33-39 and accompanying text infra. See generally F.
FURTER,

supra note 26, at 49-60;

WARREN,

supra note 31, at 301-07.

FRANK-

33. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). In
Miln, the Court sustained a New York statute which required the master of
any vessel arriving in the port of New York from out of state to furnish to the
city keeper the names, addresses and residences of his passengers. Id. at 123.
The Court, characterizing the statute as a police rather than commerce measure,
avoided the question of whether the states could regulate interstate commerce.
Id. at 132. According to Chief Justice Taney, where the state's legislation can
be characterized as an internal police measure, its authority is "complete, unqualified, and exclusive." Id. at 139.
34. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851)
(commerce clause does not deprive the states of the power to regulate intrastate
or local commerce); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 597 (1847)
(Taney, C.J., concurring) (delegation of power to Congress does not absolutely
preclude concurrent exercise of same power reserved to the states). See generally Percy, supra note 17, at 99 & n.20. Out of this era emerged the doctrine
of "dual federalism" which held that, although the national government was
supreme in its sphere, the states were equally supreme in theirs, and that these
two spheres of action should and could be kept separate. On the concept of
dual federalism, see generally E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME
COURT 1-12 (1934); Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. Rv.
1, 4 (1950).
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ing on both of these theories, the Court in Hammer v. Dagenhart35
invalidated a federal child labor law 30 on the ground that it impermissibly interfered with the State's reserved power to regulate its domestic affairs. 3 7 The decision signalled the Court's willingness to redefine
the balance of state and federal power,38 and the language of the opinion
itself similarly exposed this Court's determination to redefine the tenth
amendment in terms which would support its perception of the federal
system, not as creating a preeminent national government, but, rather,
as facilitating an orderly relationship among the individual and independent states.3 9
After Dagenhart the Supreme Court routinely sustained challenges
40
to federal commerce clause regulation under several different rationales.
35. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
36. Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675. The legislation prohibited

the transportation in interstate commerce of any article or commodity which,

within thirty days prior to shipment, had been produced at a factory employing children in excess of certain hourly restrictions. Id. See 247 U.S. at 268
n. 1.

37. 247 U.S. at 274-76. The Court advanced two reasons in support of its
determination that the law exceeded congressional authority. Id. at 276. First,
the Court noted that by exercising a power over the purely intrastate manufacture of goods, the legislation interfered with a matter of local concern. Id.
Secondly, the Court reasoned that the notion of state sovereignty would be
destroyed by the elimination of state responsibility over its domestic matters.
Id. Cf. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (invalidating Agricultural
Adjustment Act taxing farmers for excess production over federally specified
levels as invading states reserved rights over domestic affairs); Baile v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invaliding child labor law enacted under the

taxing power). But cf. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (substantially overruling United States v. Butler); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937).
38. See generally Corwin, The Power of Congress to Prohibit Commerce,
18 CORNELL L.Q. 477 (1933); Powell, The Child Labor Law, The Tenth
Amendment, and the Commerce Clause, 3 So. L.Q. (now TUL. L. REV.) 175

(1918).
39. 247 U.S. at 269-70, 274-75.

The Dagenhart Court stated that, "the

powers not expressly delegated to the National Government are reserved to
the states and to the people." Id. at 275, citing Lane County v. Oregon, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869) (emphasis added). See also United States v. Butler,
297.U.S. 1, 68 (1936); Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1871).
For Chief justice Marshall's contrary reading of the specific language of the
tenth amendment, see note 23 and accompanying text supra.
40. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (relation between local activity and economic effect on interstate commerce insufficient to
justify regulation of wholly intrastate production of coal); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (stream of commerce insufficient to
justify wage and hour restrictions on intrastate poultry production and sale);
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (indirect effect on interstate
commerce insufficient to justify regulation of sugar refineries operating wholly
intrastate).
During the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, the
Court sustained federal regulations on the basis of one of two theories. The
first theory emphasized the physical or economic effects of intrastate activities
on interstate commerce generally, and the second emphasized the need for
national "police" regulations designed to exclude from interstate commerce

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol26/iss5/4

8

Fleischmann: Constitutional Law - State Sovereignty - Federal Railway Labor Ac

1980-811

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1049

However, in United States v. Darby 41 the Court reversed this trend and
upheld the constitutionality of national minimum wage-maximum
hour controls which had been enacted under the commerce power. 42 . In
overruling Dagenhart, the Court determined that the federal commerce
power may extend to purely intrastate transactions since it is the effect
on commerce rather than the location of the regulated activity which is
the basis for the exercise of that power.43 Furthermore, the Court dismissed the tenth amendment as nothing more than a "truism," 44 reasoning that nothing in the language or the history of the amendment suggested that the framers intended that Congress should have less than
full or "plenary" power to regulate interstate commerce.45 Thus, the
products and services which were either dangerous in themselves or were considered to be injurious to the public health, welfare or morality. See Corwin,
supra note 88, at 499-506. Under both theories the Court considered state
sovereignty to be outweighed by the federal interest in assuring the integrity
of interstate commerce and the need for a robust system of trade. Compare
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) and Houston, E. & W. Texas

Ry. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914) with
Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903) and Hipolite Egg

Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
41. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
42. Id. at 115-17, 123-26. The federal legislation challenged in Darby was
the Fair Labor Standards Act. See ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1976)). The Act excluded from interstate commerce goods
produced under labor conditions below specified minimum standards. See id.
See also 312 U.S. at 108.

43. 312 U.S. at 118.
44. Id. at 124.
45. Id. The Court stated:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to
suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had been established
by the Constitution before the amendment or that its purpose was
other than to allay fears that the new national government might
seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not
be able to exercise fully their reserved powers.
Id. (emphasis added). See I ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 432, 761, 767-68 (1791);
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, §§ 1907-08 (1856). The Court
rejected once again the argument that the tenth amendment impliedly, if not
expressly, limits the power of the federal government. 312 U.S. at 124-25.
Accord, Sperry v. Flordia ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (tenth amendment not violated by the exercise of delegated power despite effect on states
domestic matters); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (tenth amendment not
violated by congressional legislation in conflict with state law, if designed to
achieve a legitimate end); Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (tenth
amendment does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated to the national government).
At least one commentator, comparing the Supreme Court's consternations
with the meaning of the tenth amendment, has noted that
The question that necessarily arises upon a comparison of Marshall's
opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden and Day's opinion in Hammer v. Dagenhart is, how did the Court ever get from the one to the other - what
were the steps? The answer is, that there were no steps. The method
of the Court was nothing so pedestrian. Rather is it to be compared
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Supreme Court concluded, and has continued to maintain, that, where
federal legislation concerns private activities which have any effect on
interstate commerce, the legislation is valid so long as it is rationally
46
related to a legitimate government objective.
On the other side of the federal government/state government coin,
however, while the Supreme Court recognized a state immunity from
the federal taxing power, 47 the Court refused to immunize the states
to that of those . . . rivers which occasionally abandon the courses
they have followed for decades and proceed to plow a new channel
to the sea ....
Corwin, supra note 30, at 17-18 (emphasis in original). The criticism appli-

cable there is equally applicable to the Court's decision in Darby overruling
Hammer v. Dagenhart and returning to the federalistic theories of Chief Justice
Marshall. See notes 18-24 and accompanying text supra.
46. 312 U.S. at 115, 121, 124. The change in the Supreme Court's attitude,
apparent in Darby, actually began in 1937 when the Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 despite challenges
that it infringed upon state sovereignty. See National Labor Relations Board
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43 (1937). Since 1937, the Supreme
Court has consistently upheld federal regulation of any activity which has a
significant effect on interstate commerce, regardless of whether the effect is
direct or indirect and without regard to whether it encroached upon the states'
traditional sphere of authority. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971) (intrastate loansharking); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964) (racial discrimination in transient lodging); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (racial discrimination in restaurants purchasing
supplies in interstate commerce); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948)
(misbranded pharmaceuticals six months after movement in interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (intrastate production and
consumption of agricultural products). For a thorough analysis of what has
been called the "1937 revolution" and its aftermath, see generally Stern, The
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-46, 59 HARV. L. REv. 645
(1946).
47. See Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871). Prior to this decision, federal instrumentalities were exempt from state regulation and taxation by virtue of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Reasoning that taxation of one level of government by the other would place
the one at the mercy of the other, the Court invalidated a federal tax on the
salary of a state judge. 78 U.S. at 127. Collector has since been overruled on
its facts. See Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939). Nonethe less, the theory that state instrumentalities and activities are exempt from
federal taxation continues to be recognized by the Court, at least so long as the
activities are part of the states traditionally recognized sphere of authority. See,
e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 453-60 (1978) (federal taxation of state owned aircraft permissible as not discriminating against essential
state function); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 576 (1946) (federal
taxation of domesticly bottled mineral water permissible as not interfering with
essential function of state government); Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405,
425 (1938) (federal taxation on salaries of employees of bistate corporation engaged in the operation of bridges, tunnels, terminals and other facilities of
interstate transportation permissible as not embracing activities constituting
essential state governmental functions); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214
(1934) (federal taxation of trustees of state-owned street railway valid where

proprietary operation of railway distinct from usual governmental functions

necessary to the independence of the state); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269
U.S. 514 (1926) (federal taxation of state employees valid where state's ability to
procure similar services from private individuals not impaired). For a thorough
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from all federal regulation under the commerce clause. 48 The doctrine
of tax immunity recognized that if one level of government could levy
a tax on the other, this power to tax would be "the power to destroy." 49
Nonetheless, the Court refused to make this analogy since it reasoned that where the states themselves engage in activities which,
if engaged in by private parties would be subject to federal control,
the states too should be subject to reasonable regulation.5 0 Thus, in
United States v. California51 the Court sustained the applicability
of the federal Safety Appliance Act 52 to California's state-owned
and operated railroad, declining to adopt the view that because
the state conducted its railroad in its sovereign capacity and for
the public's benefit,5 3 exemption from the otherwise constitutional
Similarly, in California v.
exercise of power was appropriate. 54
discussion of the issue of intergovernmental tax immunities, see generally
Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. REv.
633 (1945); Powell, The Remnant of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58
HARV.

L. REV. 757 (1945).

48. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975); United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). For a discussion of Fry, see notes 64-66 and
accompanying text infra. For a discussion of United States v. California, see
notes 51-54 and accompanying text infra.
49. See McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 341.
50. See notes 51-66 and accompanying text infra.
51. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
52. Ch. 196, §§ 2 & 6, 27 Stat. 531-32 (1893) codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 2 & 6
The act prohibits the use in interstate commerce of rail carriers
(1976).
unequipped with automatic car couplers, and provides for a $100 fine for each
violation. Id.
53. 297 U.S. at 183-86. The Court determined that California's State Belt
Railroad, although operated wholly intrastate as a "public function" and without profit, was engaged in interstate commerce by virtue of its similarity to
other commercial rail carriers operating within the area. Id. at 182-83. Profits
from the railroad were earmarked for harbor improvements around the state.
Id. at 182.
54. Id. at 183-84. The Court reasoned:
[W]e think it unimportant to say whether the state conducts its railroad
in its "sovereign" or its "public" capacity. That in operating its railroad it is acting within a power reserved to the states cannot be
doubted. The only question we need consider is whether the exercise
of that power, in whatever capacity, must be in subordination to the
power to regulate interstate commerce, which has been granted specifically to the national government. The sovereign power of the states
is necessarily diminished to the extent of the grants of power to the
federal government in the Constitution.
Id. at 183-85 (citations omitted). The Court further noted that an analogy would
not be drawn from the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity because
[t]hat immunity is implied from the nature of our federal system and
the relationship within it of state and national governments, and is
equally a restriction on taxation by either of the instrumentalities
of the other. Its nature requires that it be so construed as to allow
to each government reasonable scope for its taxing power, which would
be unduly curtailed if either . . . could withdraw from the taxing
power of the other subjects of taxation traditionally within it. Hence
we look to the activities in which the states have traditionally en-
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Taylor 55 the Supreme Court held certain collective bargaining provisions of the Railway Labor Act 56 to be applicable to California's state
owned and operated railroad, notwithstanding the fact that state law
prohibited any such bargaining rights.57 While recognizing the importance of state sovereignty, the Taylor Court nonetheless concluded
that the federal government's interest in the uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce is paramount and that conflicting state law must yield
to the federal policy.5 8
Concern for state sovereignty reached its lowest point in Maryland
v. Wirtz,59 and Fry v. United States.60 The Wirtz Court sustained chalgaged as marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal
taxing power. But there is no such limitation upon the plenary power
to regulate commerce. The state can no more deny the power if its
exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual.
Id. at 184-85 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that the danger in
using defective equipment is equally as great whether it is "used on a railroad
which state-owned or privately owned." Id. at 185.
55. 353 U.S. 533 (1957).
56. See note 5 supra.
57. 353 U.S. at 568.
58. Id. at 566-67. The State of California unsuccessfully argued that
state employees were not permitted to bargain collectively since other federal
legislation governing employer-employee relationships specifically exempted
state employees from their coverage., Id. at 559-60, 564 & n.l1, citing, for example, the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943 and the National Labor Relations
Act of 1935. Rejecting this contention, the Court stated that where Congress
wishes to exclude persons from federal legislation, it does so by affirmative
indication. 353 U.S. at 564. Despite the fact that application of the federal
act would conflict with state civil service laws, the Court found that the RailWay Labor Act was not designed to exclude state employees. Id. The Court
reasoned that "Congress no doubt concluded that a uniform method of dealing
with the labor problems of the railroad industry would tend to eliminate
inequities .... Id. at 567 (footnotes omitted).
Numerous other cases refused to exempt states from legislation enacted
under the commerce clause. See, e.g., Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975)
(state employees subject to wage freeze pursuant to Economic Stabilization Act);
Maryland v. Wirtz, 892 U.S. 183, 197 (1968) (employees of state owned hospitals and schools subject to Fair Labor Standards Act); Division 1287 Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri,
374 U.S. 74, 76, 82 (1963) (state employees' right to strike under the National
Labor Relations Act impermissibly impaired by state statute empowering governor to seize and operate public utility when operation of utility would be
threatened by impending labor strike); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric
Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wis. Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S.
383, 397-98 (1951) (state railway employees permitted to strike under National
Labor Relations Act notwithstanding state prohibition to the contrary); California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 586 (1944) (state owned docks subject tofree wharf time provisions of the United States Maritime Commission).
For examples of the Court's unwillingness to exempt activities of state governments from other federal powers, see, e.g., Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946)
(war powers); Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (foreign
commerce); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925) (treaty making
powers).
59. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).

60. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
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lenges to the 1961 and 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act,61 which extended the Act's coverage to employees of state schools
and hospitals, rejecting as untenable, the argument that the Act interfered with "sovereign state functions." 62 Whereas Wirtz did not reach
the regulation of public employees who performed tasks that are not
performed in the private sector,68 the Supreme Court did reach such
regulation in Fry, where it upheld the imposition of a national wage
64
freeze to both private and state and local governmental employees.
Stating that the state sovereignty argument had been "foreclosed" by
Wirtz,6 5 the Court reasoned that the effectiveness of the federal program
would have been "drastically impaired" if wage increases of the sizeable
group of public employees was "left outside the reach of these emergency federal wage controls." 60
61. See note 42 supra. This legislation was upheld as constitutional
against private employers in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). For
a discussion of Darby, see notes 41-46 and accompanying text supra. The
1961 amendment to the Act extended its coverage to all employees of any
"enterprise" engaged in interstate commerce or in the production of goods for
interstate commerce. 29 U.S.C. §§296, 207 (1970). The 1966 amendment
included within the definition of enterprise, both private and public hospitals
and schools. 29 U.S.C. § 9203(s)(4) (1970).
62. 392 U.S. at 197-99. The Court found it would be anticompetitive
if employees of public schools and hospitals were not paid the same level of
wages as their private counterparts. Id. at 193. Noting that the FLSA
amendments did not affect the manner in which public employees were to
perform their duties, the Court stated that the "Federal Government, when
acting within a delegated power, may override countervailing state interests
whether these be described as 'governmental' or 'proprietary' in character."
Id. at 195. Nonetheless, the Court limited its opinion by noting that it had
"ample power to prevent . . . 'the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign
political entity'" by verifying that the federal legislation was directed only
at enterprises which had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. at
196 (footnote omitted).
63. See Bogen, Usery Limits on National Interest, 22 ARIz. L. REv. 753,'
764 (1981).
64. See Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1970) (expired April 30, 1974).
65. 421 U.S. at 548.
66. Id. Justice Marshall's opinion further emphasized that the federal
program was a temporary one designed to combat inflation, and that it did
not encroach upon state sovereignty since it set no specific levels of wages but
merely froze the existing levels for all, including state employees. Id. The
Court did note, however, that "Congress may not exercise power in a fashion
that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a
federal system." Id. at 547 n.7.
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent that the tenth amendment
should be treated as an "affirmative constitutional defense" which guarantees
state immunity from federal regulation which interferes with the performance
of a state's sovereign functions, not unlike the concept of intergovernmental
tax immunity. 421 U.S. at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), citing New York
v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 586 (Stone, J. concurring). Because an across
the board wage freeze affected all aspects of state government, and was not
limited to employees performing non-essential governmental functions, Justice Rehnquist dissented in Fry. 421 U.S. at 549-50 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Since hospitals and schools were functions traditionally undertaken by the
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In 1976, however, in National League of Cities v. Usery,67 the Su-

preme Court invalidated the application of the 1974 amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state and local governmental employees,68 thereby finding a congressional enactment to be unconstitu-tional on federalistic grounds for the first time in four decades. 69 In
accepting the argument that the tenth amendment affirmatively limitsthe power of Congress to enact commerce clause legislation which directly regulates the activities of "the States as States," 70 the plurality
opinion rejected the view that states enjoy no immunity from commerce
clause regulation. 71 Apparently, the plurality contended that the intrusion into state affairs is as equally great whether it results from commerce or taxing legislation7 2 The plurality reasoned that although it
states, Justice Rehnquist further suggested that Maryland v. Wirtz be overruled. Id. at 557-59, citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). One

year later Justice Rehnquist authored the plurality opinion in National
League of Cities v. Usery, in which Wirtz was overruled. See National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). For a discussion of National
League of Cities, see notes 67-82 and accompanying text infra. On the significance of Fry, see generally Matsumoto, National League of Cities - From
Footnote to Holding - State Immunity from Commerce Clause Regulation,
1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35.

67. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
68. See note 42 supra. The 1974 amendments, inter alia, extended the
minimum wage and hour provisions to most public
the definitional sections to include "public agency"
"employer" and by also including their activities
interstate commerce. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(s)

employees by broadening
within the definition of
within the definition of
& 203(x) (1976).

69. 426 U.S. at 852. The last decision invalidating a federal law enacted
under the commerce clause was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
For one commentator's view that several pre-NationalLeague of Cities decisions
signalled this development, see Note, Municipal Bankruptcy, The Tenth
Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1871, 1871-76 (1976).
But see Friendly, supra note 19, at 1032 n.117 (questioning this early commentator's conclusions). See generally Michelman, States' Rights and States'
Roles: Permutations of Sovereignty in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86
YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities v. Usery:
The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services,
90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1099-1102 (1977).

70. 426 U.S. at 841-45. The Court was, however, careful to note that its
decision in no way undercut the otherwise plenary power of Congress to regulate private interstate commerce. Id. at 840.
71. Id. at 843 & n.14.
72. Id. at 843-44. Justice Rehnquist explained:
Surely the federal power is no less a delegated power than the commerce power . . . . Nor can characterizing the limitation recognized
upon the federal taxing power as an "implied immunity" obscure the
fact that this "immunity" is derived from the sovereignty of the States
and the concomitant barriers which such sovereignty presents to otherwise plenary authority.
Id. at 843 n.14. The Court cited New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572
(1946) (Stone, J., concurring) and Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514

(1926) in support of its view that intergovernmental immunity should apply
not only to taxing but commerce legislation.

426 U.S. at 843-45.

The Court

reserved decision on whether intergovernmental immunity applied to legisla-
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is well established that "the power to tax is the power to destroy," 7
the "ability to function effectively in a federal system.. ." 74 is as equally
threatened by commerce clause regulation which displaces the states'
75
decision making authority.
Justice Rehnquists' plurality opinion, however, was careful to note
that this limitation applies solely to those activities constituting "integral governmental functions" traditionally undertaken by the states.76
The plurality determined that one such attribute is a state's power to
determine the level of wages and hours of employment for employees
who are performing particular governmental functions.7 7 To Justice
tion enacted under other sections of the Constitution such as the enforcement
provision of the fourteenth amendment. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. But see Rome
v. United States, 446 U.S. 159, 179 (1980) (tenth amendment places no restrictions on congressional power "to enforce the Civil War Amendments 'by appropriate legislation.' "): Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 542-56 (1976)

(constitutional principles of federalism do not restrict congressional power to
invade state autonomy when Congress legislates under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment).
73. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 341. See note 49 and

accompanying text supra.
74. 426 U.S. at 852, citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542,' 547 n.7
(1975). For a discussion of Fry, see notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
75. 426 U.S. at 854.
76. Id. at 851. The Court employed several different formulations of the
integral governmental function standard: "essential governmental functions,"
id. at 839; "important governmental activities," id. at 847; "governmental
services which their citizens require," id.; "traditional aspects of state sovereignty," id. at 849; "typical services . . . which States have traditionally
afforded their citizens," id. at 851; and "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," id. at 852.
As pointed out by one commentator, the Court uses "integral" and "tradi.
tional" in the same phrase on at least two separate occasions: "integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions," id. at 852; and "an
integral portion of those services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens," id. at 855. See Michelman,
supra note 69, at 1172 & n.28 (1977). Professor Michelman offers two possible
definitions for the Court's vague references to the term "integral" as modified
by the notion of traditional state governmental functions: 1) "functions that
cannot be foregone or impaired without impairing other functions;" or 2)
"functions . . . which exemplify some general, structured notion of a core
of governmental competency or responsibility." Id. at 1172 n.28 (emphasis in
original). The distinction which is drawn cannot be overlooked since state
governments often provide services which are traditional, but not integral.
See id. Adopting the second definition above, Professor Michelman reads
National League of Cities as enunciating a theory of constitutional restraint
which offers the states protection in their role as provider of important governmental services. See id. For a discussion of the lower courts' response to this
varying terminology in National League of Cities, see notes 84 & 85 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion of one court's view that the governmental function standard subsumes both functions traditionally and currently
provided by the states, see notes 88 & 89 and accompanying text infra. For a
criticism of this ten-ninology and the likely resolution of any confusion oc-

casioned by its imprecision, see notes 166-71 and accompanying text infra.
77. 426 U.S. at 851-52. In addition the Court cited as illustrative of other
governmental functions, providing for fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. Id. at 851 n.16. The choice
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Rehnquist, interference with such a fundamental policy decision was
a strain which the federal system could not tolerate.78 The plurality
recognized, however, that federal legislation could override an "integral
governmental function" where the need for emergency action was carefully addressed.79 Furthermore, in providing the fifth and necessary
vote to invalidate the FLSA amendments, Justice Blackmun's concurrence stressed that even in non-emergency situations, federal regulation
should be upheld where the federal objectives are "demonstrably greater"
than the state's interest in its sovereignty.8 0 Thus, notwithstanding its
of state capitols, and hospitals and schools were also brought into this list of
protected governmental functions. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)
(invalidating applicability of FLSA to state hospitals and schools) (overruled
in opinion); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (cited with approval in
opinion as example of integral governmental function). Railroad operations
were the only area singled out as non-integral governmental functions. 426
U.S. at 854 n.18, citing United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). In

upholding this result rather than the rationale of United States v. California
the Court stated that railroads have never been considered an integral part of
State government activities.

Id. See note 34 supra.

In 1979, the Department of Labor (Department), in accordance with
National League of Cities, promulgated regulations for administrative decisions

to determine which state activities constitute "integral governmental functions"
exempt from the FLSA. See 29 C.F.R. § 775 (1979). The Department has
stated that the following are non-integral governmental functions: alcoholic
beverage stores; off-track betting corporations, local mass transit systems; generation and distribution of electric power, residential and commercial telephone
and telegraphic communications; production and sale of organic fertilizer as a
byproduct of sewage processing; production, cultivation, growing and harvesting
of agricultural commodities for sale to consumers; and repair and maintenance
of boats and marine engines for the general public. Id. at §§ 775.3(l)-(8).
(emphasis added) The regulations codify the examples listed in National
League of Cities. See id. at § 775.2. But see United Transp. Union v. Long
Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980); Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp.
880 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (finding mass transit systems as integral governmental
function).
78. 426 U.S. at 845-57. The Court stated that compliance with the wage
and hour provisions of the FLSA unduly interfered with the states, citing as
significant: 1)the increased costs which higher wage levels would occasion; 2)
the possibility that states would be forced to relinquish other important governmental functions in whole or in part in order to assure that limited revenues
would cover the added expense; and 3) the interference which federal legislation would have on the considered policy choices of local governmental officials
who have determined not to honor the federal standards. Id. at 846-48. The
Court was most concerned with the fact that the FLSA would dictate the
manner in which a state determined to provide its citizens with certain services.
Id. at 847.
79. Id. at 853. Although he had dissented the year before in Fry, Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion distinguished Fry v. United States. by
noting that the tenth amendment limitation is "not so inflexible as to preclude
temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emergency." Id., citing
Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
80. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun joined
the plurality on the "understanding" that even where integral governmental
functions are involved, federal regulation will be sustained where, as in environmental matters, the federal interest is "demonstrably greater" than the
state interest and where state compliance is essential to the federal scheme.
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historic refusal to extend the concept of intergovernmental tax immunity to the commerce power,8l the Court concluded that the tenth amendment could properly be invoked to limit federal intervention into state
82
affairs.
Since the National League of Cities decision, the Supreme Court
has reaffirmed its recognition of states as sovereign entities, 83 although
it has not offered any clarification on precisely how to identify "integral
governmental functions." 84 As a result, lower courts have been forced
Id. Despite the statement of this balancing test, several commentators have
argued that the plurality declined to accept this approach. See Matsumoto,
supra note 66, at 71 n.193; Tushnet, Constitutional and Statutory Analysis
in the Law of Federal jurisdiction, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1301, 1338 & 1340
(1978). But see Horowitz, The Autonomy of the Univ. of California Under
the State Constitution, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 23, 33 (1977); Kilberg &cFort,
National League of Cities v. Usery, Its Meaning and Impact, 45 GEo. WASH.

L. REV. 613, 616 n.26 (1977).
81. See notes 48-66 and accompanying text supra.
82. 426 U.S. at 845. It has been suggested that four defects permeate the
Court's decision.

Initially, at least one commentator has questioned whether

the language of the tenth amendment which "appears to reserve precisely the
same sphere of autonomy 'to the States respectively' and 'to the people'
[furnishes] ...a basis for distinguishing federal commerce regulation of private
employers from similar regulation of public employers." Tribe, supra note 69,
at 1069 n.17. See 426 U.S. 833, 861-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Another

commentator has neatly summarized the remaining defects as including: I) the
irrationality of limiting intergovernmental immunity to only commerce clause
regulation, since it is untenable to maintain that Congress will interfere with
the states to a larger degree under one clause than another; 2) the fact that
the Court's willingness to defer to integral governmental functions reflecting
"considered policy choices" ignores the fact that each decision by governmental officials can be similarly characterized; and 3) the inflexibility of a rule
which affords protection from federal regulation of only functions traditionally
undertaken by government rather than ones undertaken in a sense of experimentation. See Tushnet, supra note 80, at 1339-40. For the applicability of
the last two criticisms to the principal case under discussion, see notes 156-63
and accompanying text infra.
83. See, e.g., Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 170 (1980); Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412 n.42 (1978).
84. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power Sc Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
In Lafayette, the Court found that municipally owned electric utilities were
not exempt from federal antitrust regulations because of a "presumption
against implied exclusions from coverage .......
Id. at 399. Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion avoided discussion on the integral governmental function
standard and made only passing reference to the consistency of this holding
with National League of Cities. Id. at 412 n.42. The plurality's disregard,
however, has engendered a substantial amount of criticism. See, e.g., Lafayette
v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 430 (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &cHosp., 612 F.2d 84, 99 n.21 (3d Cir.
1979) (en banc), rev'd and remanded on another issue, - U.S. - (1981); Comment, National League of Cities and the PARKER Doctrine: The Status of State
Sovereignty Under the Commerce Clause, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301, 308
(1980) [hereinafter referred to as Status of State Sovereignty]
In contrast to the plurality opinion, Chief Justice Burger's concurring

opinion relied on the proprietary character of the electric utility, noting that
the operation of a business enterprise has never been regarded as an integral
governmental function. 435 U.S. at 423-24 (Burger,..C.J., concurring). According to the Chief Justice, if the relevant inquiry is not simply whether the
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to make case-by-case determinations, often focusing on discrepant factors in their analysiss 5 While some courts have limited themselves to
state conducts its affairs in a proprietary capacity, then, at a minimum, "[tjhe
threshold inquiry . . . is whether the activity is required by the State acting
as sovereign." Id. at 425 (Burger, C.J., concurring), quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975) (emphasis added by Chief Justice
Burger).
Outside of Lafayette, the commentary on the Supreme Court's failure to
clarify the integral governmental function standard has been enormous. Professor Michelman especially criticizes any distinction drawn on governmental
versus proprietary lines, the states often delegate their governmental responsibilities to private organizations which operate in their stead. Michelman, supra note 69, at 1168-69. The bulk of the commentary, however, contends that the integral governmental function standard, outside of the Court's
partial list of protected functions, is imprecise and unworkable with respect
to the identification of additional governmental functions which are immune
from federal commerce clause regulation. For a sampling of this commentary,
see generally Beaird & Ellington, A Commerce Power Seasaw: Balancing National League of Cities, 11 GA. L. REv. 35, 65 (1976) (unclear standard);
Matsumoto, supra note 66, at 73 (uncertain standard); Note, State Sovereignty
and Commerce Power - State Employees Exempt from Federal Minimum
Wage Law, 9 CONN. L. REV. 691, 696 (1977) (list of protected governmental
functions provide only guide for identifying integral state functions);
Note, At Federalism's Crossroads: National League of Cities v. Usery, 57
B.U.L. REV. 178, 192-93 (1977) (highly ambiguous and unworkable standard);
Note, National League of Cities v. Usery: A New Approach to State Sovereignty?, 48 U. CoLo. L. REV. 467, 471 & 476-77 (1977) (standard provides no
method for conducting constitutional inquiry into what regulations impermissibly abridge state sovereignty). See also Tribe, supra note 69, at 1070; Note,
The Essential Governmental Function After National League of Cities: Impact
of an Essentiality Test on Commuter Rail Transportation, 9 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 149, 155.68 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Commuter Rail Transportation].
85. See, e.g., New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616
F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1980) (whether federal legislation displaces state's ability to
control employment decisions); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.,
612 F.2d 84, 99 n.21 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), rev'd and remanded on another
issue, - U.S. - (1981) (weighing of source of congressional power and legitimacy
against degree of interference with integral state governmental functions);
Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (balancing the
source of congressional power and legitimacy of exercise against degree of interference with integral government functions of states and political subdivisions); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (6th Cir. 1979)
(whether regulation displaces or significantly alters state activity); Arritt v.
Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (4th Cir. 1977) (limiting integral governmental
function standard to commerce clause legislation and refusing to apply standard
to legislation enacted under § 5 of fourteenth amendment); Usery v. Charleston County School Dist, 558 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1977) and Usery v. Allegheny
County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 546
(1977) (refusing to extend National League of Cities to legislation not squarely
based on commerce clause); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Kramarsky, 485 F. Supp.
300 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (state legislation not preempted by federal law where
state regulation affects conduct "deeply rooted in local feeling"); Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclam. Assn, Inc. v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425, 435
(W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd sub nom., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclam. Ass'n, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981) (weighing federal interest
in environmental protection against state's control over land within its
borders rather than particular service furnished by state government); Indiana
v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980), rev'd sub nom., Hodel v. Indiana. 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981) (degree rather than nature of federal involvement
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National League of Cities' examples of integral functions, other courts,
focusing on Justice Blackmun's concurrence,8 0 have adopted a balancing
approach under which federal regulation of integral governmental functions will be upheld where the federal interest is "demonstrably greater"
than the state interest.81 The Sixth Circuit, faced with a question of the
applicability of federal regulations to a municipal airport in Amersbach
v. City of Cleveland,88 attempted to synthesize a manageable standard
and articulated a four-prong test by which claims of integral governmental functions could be evaluated.89 While variations on this analysis
into state affairs); Pharmaceutical Mfg. Ass'n v. F.D.A., 484 F. Supp. 1179 (D.
Del. 1980) (whether federal regulation interferes with an area traditionally
regulated by the states); Oklahoma v. Harris, 480 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1979)
(whether compliance with federal regulation precludes claim that tenth amendment violated by statute); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island
Rapid Transit Operating Auth., 100 L.R.R.M. 3154 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1979)
(rejecting balancing approach altogether).
86. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
87. See, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, Inc. v. Andrus,
483 F. Supp. 425, 435 (W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd sub nom., Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981); Remmick v.
Barnes County, 435 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.N.D. 1977); Colorado v. Veterans
Admin., 430 F. Supp. 551, 559 (D. Colo. 1977), afJ'd on other grounds, 602
F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014 (1980); Usery v. Edward
J. Meyer Memorial Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). Several
circuits, while not reading the NationalLeague of Cities opinion as mandating
a balancing approach, have nonetheless examined the federal interests in determining whether federal regulation impermissibly interferes with an allegedly
integral state governmental function. See, e.g., United States v. Ohio Dep't
of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195, 1205 (6th Cir. 1980); Peel v. Florida Dep't of
Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1083 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Special April 1977 Grand
Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046
(1978); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1978); Friends of
the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 37-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902
(1977).
88. 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). At issue was the applicability of federal
wage and hour regulations to employees of Cleveland's municipally operated
airport. Id. at 1034. For a discussion of the federal legislation and the FLSA
in general, see notes 42 & 68 and accompanying text supra.
89. 598 F.2d at 1036-37. The court analyzed each of the protected governmental functions in National League of Cities and discerned the following
common elements:
(1) the government service or activity benefits the community as a
whole and is available to the public at little or no direct expense;
(2) the service or activity is undertaken for the purpose of public
service rather than pecuniary gain;
(3) government is the principal provider of the service or the activity;
and
(4) government is particularly suited to provide the service or perform
the activity because of a communitywide need for the service or
activity.
Id. at 1037. Utilizing this test, the court determined that the economic circumstances surrounding the operation of airports has "demonstrated" that they
"must be maintained by municipal corporations or other units of government."
Id. at 1037-38. The court was careful to note that integral governmental
functions need not be limited to those traditionally undertaken by government,
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have led some courts to conclude that other governmental functions are
immune from federal regulation,9 0 for the most part lower courts have
but must also include new functions or services which government assumes to
meet the changing demands and needs of its citizens. Id. at 1037. For a
particularly thorough study of Amersbach which generally is disapproving of
its result and rationale, see Note, National League of Cities Crashes On Takeoff: Balancing Under the Commerce Clause, 68 GEO. L.J. 827 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Crashing on Take-off].
90. See, e.g., Brister v. City of Memphis, 615 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1980)
(unpublished opinion) (museums); United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102
(9th Cir. 1978) (use of public highways); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773,
775 (8th Cir. 1977) (state prison industries); Alewine v. City Council, 505 F.
Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981) (mass transportation bus system); Indiana v. Andrus,
501 F. Supp. 452 (1980), rev'd sub nom., Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376
(1981) and Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n Inc. v. Andrus, 483 F.
Supp. 425, 435 (W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd sub nom., Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981) (land use sufficiently akin
to other governmental functions); Jordon v. Mills, 473 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Mich.
1979) (state prison stores); Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. v.
International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 57 A.D.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773,
appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977) (city transit
system). Cf. New York City Transit Auth. v. Loos, 2 Misc. 2d 733, 154
N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd 3 A.D.2d 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1957) (operation of city transit system a proper and necessary governmental function).
Two decisions have been extremely liberal in interpreting the integral
governmental function standard. In Virginia Surface Mining, the district
court found that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977
operated to displace the state's traditional governmental function in regulating
land use, and that it therefore violated the tenth amendment. 483 F. Supp. at
435. See 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1979). The court found that the Act constricts
the State's ability to make "essential decisions" through "the forced relinquishment of state control of land use planning; through loss of state control of its
economy; and through economic harm, from expenditure of state funds to
implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power of certain
counties, cities, and towns." 483 F. Supp. at 435, citing National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 849. See also Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452,
456 (S.D. Ind. 1980), rev'd sub noma., Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct. 2376 (1981).
But see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclaim. Ass'n Inc., 101 S.
Ct. 2352 (1981) (overruling district court); Marshall v. Conway, 491 F. Supp.
1123 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (congressional interest in protecting coal and other miners
significantly greater than state's interest in protecting against expenditure of
public funds in compliance of federal safety regulations, and specifically declining to follow Virginia Surface Mining).
In Staten Island Rapid Transit, the New York Supreme Court, Second
Department, examined the state operation of Staten Island's only commuter
rail line and, notwithstanding the refusal in National League of Cities to
designate railroads as an integral governmental function, concluded that a
commuter rail service, functioning primarily intrastate, qualified as an essential
governmental activity entitled to immunity from federal commerce clause
regulation under the federal Railway Labor Act. 57 A.D.2d at 615-16, 393
N.Y.S.2d at 775. In reaching this determination, the court admitted that the
rail service operated pursuant to an Interstate Commerce Commission certificate, and that its employees had a long history of collective bargaining under
the federal Railway Labor Act. Id. at 616, 393 N.Y.2d at 775. The court concluded, moreover, that because the state is "committed" to covering the operating deficit of the rail service, and because the ICC had granted various exemptions from the Interstate Commerce Act in the past, public employees in New
York could be enjoined from engaging in strikes during labor disputes despite
federal regulation permitting such action. Id. at 615-16, 393 N.Y.S.2d at
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been hesitant to expand National League of Cities,91 perhaps evidencing the fear that expansion might signal a reactionary shift in the federal
92
system.
It was against this background that the Second Circuit considered
UTU.93 In writing for the court, Judge Sweet began his analysis by
affirming the district court's finding that the LIRR is a "carrier" subject to the provisions of the RLA. 94 Turning to the constitutional
777-76. Compare N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW. § 210(1) (McKinney 1973) with Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 194 U.S. 369, 384-85
(1969) (recognizing right to strike implicit within Railway Labor Act). See
also Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operat-

ing Auth., 100 L.R.R.M. 3154 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9. 1979).

For a discussion of

extending integral governmental function statuts to commuter rail transportation, see Commuter Rail Transportation, supra note 84, at 173-78.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d
1195 (6th Cir. 1980) (Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1976), not violative of
state sovereignty as it only indirectly interferes with state's right to license
vehicles and control use of public highways); New Hampshire Dep't of Employ.
Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir. 1980) (Federal Unemployment Tax

Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1976), not violative of state sovereignty due to voluntary
nature of program); Public Service Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 587
F.2d 716 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979) (federal regulation of
state proprietary production of natural gas not interference with traditional
aspect of state governmental functions); Hyland v. Fukuda, 580 F.2d 977, 981
n.5 (9th Cir. 1978) (federal statute prohibiting employment of convicted felons as
prison security guards permissible as only indirect intrusion into state affairs);
In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 592 (7th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978) (federal subpoena directed at individual
consistent with tenth amendment since effect on state too indirect).
92. See Michelman, supra note 69, at 1193; Schwartz, supra note 29, at
1134; Status of State Sovereignty, supra note 75, at 332; Note, Civil Rights
Suits Against State and Local Governmental Entities and Officials: Rights of
Action, Immunities and Federalism, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 1107-11 (1980).
Subsequent to the decision in the principal case under discussion, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia reached a
similar result. See Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
In Alewine, the court considered a state and federal law claim brought by
former bus drivers for the City Council of Augusta, Georgia, seeking overtime
compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 883. The court
cited the principal case for the proposition that "integral operations of governmental functions may become traditional, or less so, depending on the
change of times and the needs of a developing society." Id. at 888, citing
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980). Applying the four prong test enunciated in Amersbach, supra note 89, the

court concluded that integral governmental functions may reflect the expectations of a changing society and, accordingly, that the operation of a city
bus system is such a function notwithstanding the fact that users of the service
are required to bear part of the burden of its financial operation. 505 F. Supp.
at 889.
93. Judge Sweet of the Southern District of New York, sitting by designa.
tion, delivered the opinion of the court in which Circuit Judge Mulligan and
District Judge Spears of the Western District of Texas, sitting by designation,
joined.
94. 634 F.2d at 22. Judge Sweet noted that the LIRR and MTA did not
seriously dispute that the LIRR is subject to the literal terms of the RLA,
though he questioned the district court's reliance on a recent decision by the
Interstate Commerce Commission reaching a similar conclusion since the LIRR
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issue 95 Judge Sweet undertook an examination of National League of
Cities.96 After considering the lower courts' response to National League
of Cities,97 Judge Sweet stated that within the facts of this case, National
League of Cities suggests a two-tiered approach for determining whether
the RLA impermissibly interferes with the state's ability to structure its
employer-employee relationships in commuter rail transportation: 98 1)
states are immune from federal regulation to the extent that the activity
in question involves an "integral or traditional governmental function" 99
and 2) if the activity does involve such a function, the balance between
federal and state interests must not be substantially weighted toward the
federal interest. 00
In applying this analysis, Judge Sweet proceeded from the premise
that compliance with the RLA would directly interfere with the labor
policy decisions of the state's government officials. 101 Citing the public
policy behind the Taylor Law, 102 Judge Sweet explained that the effects
was not a party to that dispute. Id. at 23, citing Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority, Finance Docket
No. 29011 (Nov. 8, 1979). See note 15 supra. Moreover, Judge Sweet stated
that although an "essentially local commuter transportation system" such as
the LIRR may be the descendant of the "suburban electric railways" which
Congress excluded from the RLA, it was "not clear" whether Congress intended
to exclude interurban railroads such as the LIRR which also conducted a
significant amount of interstate freight commerce. 634 F.2d at 23. See 45
U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
95. 634 F.2d at 23. Judge Sweet reached the constitutional issue since the
LIRR is a publicly owned enterprise. Id. For a discussion of the LIRR's
state ownership, see note 2 supra. Were the LIRR a privately owned entity,
Judge Sweet stated that traditional commerce clause analysis would require a
finding that the RLA preempted the Taylor Law. 634 F.2d at 23. For a discussion of traditional commerce clause analysis, see notes 18-46 and accompanying text supra.
96. 634 F.2d at 23-24. See 426 U.S. 833 (1976) discussed at notes 67-82
and accompanying text supra.
97. 634 F.2d at 24. See notes 85-91 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 90 8c 91 and accompanying text supra.
99. 634 F.2d at 24. Because of the variety of terminology employed by
the National League of Cities Court, Judge Sweet defined the state's making
of certain choices and decisions in connection with its role as sole provider of
public services as "essential governmental decisions." Id. at 24-25, quoting
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 850. He defined those types of
public services singled out for protection against federal regulation as "integral
governmental functions." 634 F.2d at 25, quoting National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 850. For a discussion of this terminology and one commentator's difficulties with the Supreme Court's numerous formulations, see
note 76 supra. For the sake of consistency, unless otherwise indicated, this
note will employ Judge Sweet's terminology.
100. 634 F.2d at 24. For a discussion of the balancing test as articulated
by justice Blackmun in his Natioial League of Cities concurrence, see note 20
and accompanying text supra.
101. 634 F.2d at 25.
102. Id. New York's Civil Service Law enunciates the legislative policy
behind the Taylor Law as follows:
The legislature of the state of New York declares that it is the public
policy of the state and the purpose of this act to promote harmonious
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of transit strikes 103 made it clear that the state's interest in uninterrupted public transportation is of such a character that the RLA's selfhelp provision is inimical to the state's sovereign right to make "'fundamental employment decisions' that are "'essential to their separate and
independent existence.' " 104
Upon this foundation, Judge Sweet examined the nature of com:muter rail transportation and concluded that the operation of the LIRR
.serves an "integral governmental function" despite contrary dicta in
.several Supreme Court decisions. 10 5 Noting that while National League
of Cities had characterized railroads as a non-essential or non-integral
.governmental function, 06 Judge Sweet considered the instant situation
,distinguishable. 107 First, Judge Sweet noted what he considered an
obvious difference between the operation of a "purely freight" railroad
and an urban commuter rail service.' 08 More important, in Judge
and cooperative relationships between government and its employees
and to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly and
uninterrupted operations and functions of government. These policies
are best effectuated by . . . (e) continuing the prohibition against
strikes by public employees and providing remedies for violations of
such prohibition.
N.Y. Civ.

SERV. LAW

§ 200 (McKinney 1973).

103. 634 F.2d at 25. Referring to the transit strike which crippled New
York City in 1966 and which prompted enactment of the Taylor Law, Judge
.Sweet stated that by precluding the state from enforcing this legislation, in.cluding its no-strike provision, the RLA "eliminates a key provision in the
.State's legislative effort to provide its citizens with continuous public transportation." Id.
104. Id., quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851 (1976)
(quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)). Judge Sweet explained
that by complying with the RLA's self-help provisions the state could be forced
to increase wages or grant other concessions in order to avert the severe economic injury that has occurred in the past when rail service was interrupted
by strikes. 634 F.2d at 25 & n.19 citing Cirrillo, New Yorkers Ride Again,
Associated Press, April 12, 1980 (estimated $100 million daily losses to private
.sector, $1.1 billion to local government as a result of 11-day transit strike in
April, 1980).
105. 634 F.2d at 26-27, discussing United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936) and Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). For
-a discussion of United States v. California, see notes 51-54 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., see
7note 84 supra.
106. 634 F.2d at 26, citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
*at 854 n.18. See note 77 supra.
107. 634 F.2d at 26. Judge Sweet questioned the rationale for excluding
railroads from the protected core of governmental functions, particularly "the
.closer these railroads come to resembling commuter lines." Id. Judge Sweet
noted that several commentators had also raised this concern. Id., citing
Michelman, supra note 69, at 1172 n.28. See also id. at 1187 n.73.
108. 634 F.2d at 26. Whereas the interstate freight railroad in United
*States v. California only incidentally benefited the public by earmarking its
.profits for harbor improvements, Judge Sweet observed that "[t]he LIRR, on
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Sweet's mind, however, was the financial history of the LIRR which
indicated that no private supplier could provide the service in question
and bear the losses which the LIRR consistently suffered. 100 Judge
Sweet observed that termination of the state's involvement in the LIRR
would severely impact on the public's ability to live and work in and
around the metropolitan area."10 Focusing on the mass transportation
aspect of the function rather than on the railroad element, Judge Sweet
reasoned that in the New York City metropolitan area, the need served
by the LIRR is as fundamental as such acknowledged governmental
the other hand, as a provider of passenger transportation in a metropolitan
area, furnishes a very important public service which has come to be supplied
primarily by state and local governments." Id. See 426 U.S. at 854-55 & n.18.
For the evidence in support of this conclusion, see notes 109-14 and accompanying text infra. For a criticism of this determination, see notes 156-58 and
accompanying text infra.
109. 634 F.2d at 27-28 & nn.26-27. Judge Sweet noted that New York's
purchase of the railroad was premised on the inability of private enterprise to
operate the facility. Id. at 28 n.27, citing Testimony of William J. Ronan,
former Chairman of the New York State Metropolitan Commuter Transit
Authority, in EFFECT OF RAILROAD MERGERS ON COMMUTER TRANSPORTATION:
HEARINGS

BEFORE THE SUBCOMM.

ON

HOUSING

AND

URBAN

AFFAIRS OF THE

90th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as HEARINGS]. According to the LIRR:
The State has poured over a billion dollars into the New York
metropolitan area commuter network in general, and hundreds of
millions of dollars into the LIRR, in particular. For example, in
1979 alone, New York provided the LIRR's passenger operations with
its own and local subsidies of $129 million, as well as allocating -n
additional $9 million of scarce federal Urban Mass Transportation Act
entitlements to the LIRR. In 1979, the State and its municipalities
also contributed over $550 million to the operating deficits of the
New York metropolitan area transit network. In addition to the
direct subsidies, New York has granted tax exemptions to the LIRR
since 1950.
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 7, UTU v. LIRR, 634 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980),
cited in Commuter Rail Transportation,supra note 84, at 159 n.72. Implicitly,
udge Sweet concluded that, because of the sheer improbability that New York
ad invested in the LIRR in hopes of realizing a financial profit, its continuous
subsidization attested to the integral governmental function status of commuter rail service. See 634 F.2d at 27-28. The fact that the federal governSENATE

COMM.

ON BANKING

AND

CURRENCY,

ment provides large amounts of money to support the LIRR did not affect the
state immunity determination according to Judge Sweet since schools, hospitals
and law enforcement all receive federal aid, but are considered integral state
governmental functions. Id. at 28 n.26, citing National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. at 878.
110. 634 F.2d at 26-27. In support of this assertion Judge Sweet noted
that in 1970 [sic] certain state governmental officials had predicted that if the
LIRR went out of existence, a minimum of 26 lanes of expressway in and out
of New York City would be required to accommodate the commuter traffic
which would be forced onto the street. Id. at 27 n.22, citing HEARINGS, supra

note 109, at 138 (testimony of William J. Ronan). In addition, it had been
speculated, at that time, that ten blocks in the center of New York City would
have to be reserved for commuter parking. Id. Taken as a whole, Judge
Sweet observed that current restrictions of the public's "profligate transportation practices" demonstrate that the public is increasingly becoming dependent
on mass transportation. 634 F.2d at 27.
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'functions as sanitation or public parks and recreation."' Although he
.admitted that federal precedent suggested a contrary approach, 1 2 Judge
Sweet concluded that in deciding what constitutes an integral governmental function, it is appropriate to consider the importance of the
service to the local community and the public's expectation that government will assure that service's provision despite economic uncertainties."13 Thus, Judge Sweet determined that the concepts of "traditional"
or "integral" are best understood in terms which permit expansion to
meet the increased demands which a changing society may require of its
government.114
111. 634 F.2d at 27.

The court observed that "[w]ithout the LIRR,

commuters would find it difficult or impossible to get to their jobs, and the
reduced influx of people into New York City would have a significant impact
upon the economy of the city and the State." Id. at 26 (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 27-28. judge Sweet referred to several pre-National League of
Cities decisions which 'had rejected the importance of the "public function"
for determining the essential quality of a particular state activity. Id. at 27,
citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974) (rejecting "essential public service" test for identifying state action); Amalgamated

Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employ.
Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1951) (rejecting importance of gas and

transit service in decision to permit strikes under National Labor Relations
Act despite contradictory provisions of state law). Judge Sweet also referred
to Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978), another

case in which the Court declined to engage in a "public service" analysis in
holding that municipally operated electric utilities are not exempt from the
federal antitrust laws. 634 F.2d at 27-28. See note 113 infra.
113. 634 F.2d at 28-29. In accord with the Sixth Circuit, Judge Sweet
argued that the level of public financing required to support a public service,
and the potential harm which an interruption of such service would occasion,
were strong indications that the particular activity is "not only . . . essential
to the public, but [that] it is also essential that the government step in to
furnish it." Id. at 28, citing Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033,
1037-38 (6th Cir. 1979). In reaching this conclusion Judge Sweet distinguished
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., by pointing out that the Lafayette
-Court's reluctance to exempt municipally owned electric utilities from federal
antitrust laws was based on a presumption against exclusion, rather than a
finding that the provision of electric service did not constitute an integral
,governmental function as defined by National League of Cities. 634 F.2d at
28. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 399, 415
(1978). Judge Sweet explained that while the operation of an electric utility

may be as important as the operation of a commuter rail service, because the
municipality in Lafayette, unlike the MTA, competed with other private
utilities for customers in area, the public was not "completely dependent" on
the state to provide an arguably integral governmental function. 634 F.2d at
28. See 435 U.S. at 391 n.3, 403-08, 422 n.3. For a brief discussion of Lafayette
.and the willingness of Chief Justice Burger to analyze the issue in terms of the
nature of the activity as opposed to the plurality's narrow reading of the antitrust laws, see note 94 and accompanying text supra.
114. 634 F.2d at 26, citing Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d
1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 1979). Judge Sweet quoted Justice Douglas' observation
that " '[w hat might have been viewed in an earlier day as an improvident
.or even dangerous extension of state activities may today be deemed indispensible.'"
634 F.2d at 26, quoting New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572, 591 (1946) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For a discussion of this determination, see notes 133-41 and accompanying text infra. For a criticism of this
.determination, see notes 156-58 and accompanying text infra.
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Building on his concept of state sovereignty which gauges the essentiality of government functions not only in terms of the nature of a
public service but also its availability in the market place,"15 Judge
Sweet moved to the second tier of his inquiry 116 and acknowledged that
such a concept might have a devastating impact on the system of national government. 117 Judge Sweet contended, however, that adherence
to the balancing of interests approach suggested by Justice Blackmun
in his National League of Cities concurrence 118 would maintain the

balance in the federal system and yet return to the states a significant
amount of power over essentially internal or local problems.119 Applying Justice Blackmun's test that a "demonstrably greater" federal interest should override a state's claim of immunity even in an area found
to involve an integral function,120 Judge Sweet concluded that the RLA
did not contain the required interest.' 21 In view of what he considered
to be the common goals of the two statutes to provide for an orderly
method of resolving labor disputes and to ensure continuous rail service, 122 Judge Sweet declared that it was unclear how the right to self-help
under the RLA could be considered to represent a "demonstrably
greater" interest than the state's prohibition of all strikes by public
employees. 23 Because the LIRR received the bulk of its revenues from
115.
116.
117.
concept,

634 F.2d at 29.
See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
634 F.2d at 29. Apparently Judge Sweet acknowledged that this
like National League of Cities itself "will spur a new era of sep-

aratism .....

"

Id.

118. See note 80 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
critical and judicial response to Justice Blackmun's balancing test, see notes
80 & 85-87 and accompanying text supra. For a criticism of the balancing
approach as applied to the instant case, see notes 160-65 and accompanying text
infra.

119. 634 F.2d at 29.
120. See notes

160-65 and accompanying text supra.

Judge

Sweet's

decision to apply the balancing approach was controlled by the Second Circuit's prior endorsement of the concept. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey,
552 F.2d 25, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).

121. 634 F.2d at 29-30. See notes 122 & 123 and accompanying text infra.
122. 634 F.2d at 29. For the public policy behind the Taylor Law, see
note 102 supra. For the policy underlying the RLA, see generally 45 U.S.C.

§ 151a (1980).

See also California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553, 566 (1957) (avoid-

ing interuption of interstate commerce is the "primary purpose" behind RIA).

123. 634 F.2d at 29-30.

Judge Sweet reasoned that the Taylor Law's

prohibition of strikes furthered the federal purpose embodied in the RLA
by helping the LIRR to maintain its status as a "vital link" in the flow of
interstate commerce. Id. at 29. Moreover, because the Taylor Law only preempted a portion of the federal scheme, California v. Taylor was distinguishable on the ground that there the California statute placed an absolute prohibition on all collective bargaining rights of railroad employees. Id. See
California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. at 559-60. See also SIRTOA v. International
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its commuter rather than freight service, Judge Sweet concluded that,
from a "purely practical viewpoint," New York had a far greater interest
in dispute resolution 124 relating to the LIRR than does the, federal
government and, therefore, found that the RLA was unconstitutional
25
as applied.1
In analyzing the Second Circuit's opinion, it is submitted that,
although the court was correct in some of its determinations, it also left
several questions unanswered. Initially, it is submitted that the UTU
court was correct in focusing on the functional role of the states, 126 since
there is great merit to the notion that state and local governments rather
than the central government should bear the burden of providing certain important social services. 127 Faced with the uncertain rule of
National League of Cities,128 it is submitted that the UTU court, by
defining integral governmental functions as those which the public has
come to expect and demand in light of the changing needs of a developBhd. of Electric Workers, 57 A.D.2d 614, 393 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775-76 (2d Dept.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 934 (1977).
124. 634 F.2d at 29-30. The LIRR derived approximately 80% of its
1979 revenues from commuter service and 20% from its freight operations.
See notes 2 &c15 supra. For a criticism of the court's reliance upon these
statistics, see notes 160-65 and accompanying text infra.
125. 634 F.2d at 30. For a criticism of this determination, see notes
166-69 and accompanying text infra.
126. 634 F.2d at 26-27. See notes 105 & 108-114 and accompanying text
.supra.

127. See Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869), cited
in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 844, 845 (1976). By
finding that a state's "integral governmental functions" are immune from
federal regulation under the commerce clause, it is submitted that National
League of Cities recognized this view. See 426 U.S. at 847, 851. For a discussion of the reasoning underlying that decision, see notes 71-78 and accompanying text supra.
At least one commentator has argued that despite expansive judicial
readings of the federal government's enumerated and implied powers, the
understanding that states are responsible for basic governmental services is
implicit in the tenth amendment, and "deeply entrenched in the traditional
and actual political practice of American federalism .... " Michelman, supra
note 69, at 1173. Professor Michelman explains that the danger inherent in
federal interference with local concerns is one of political accountability: "The
impracticability [of federally designed programs and regulations] would be
traceable to Congress; but the political blame would fall not on Congress but
on innocent and helpless state governments. Such diminished coordination
would impair the ability of [the states] to translate popular demand for essential services into their actual provision." Id. at 1174. It is submitted that
implicit in the UTU decision is the fundamental understanding that it is not
only the right, but the obligation of the states to provide those social services
which the public requires. See notes 109-113 and accompanying text supra.
See generally Tribe, supra note 69, at 1072. For an incidental and, perhaps,
unintended effect of this view, see note 141 infra.
128. See notes 84-92 and accompanying text supra.
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ing society, 29 neither contradicts 180 nor contravenes 'a'the language of
32
National League of Cities.
In this light, then, it is submitted that by concentrating on whether
the public depends upon government to provide a communitywide service, 3 3 the UTU court illustrated that, despite contentions to the con-trary,18 4 the integral governmental function test does offer guidance on
how such functions are to be identified.18 5 Instead of limiting itself to
the precise facts of National League of Cities or that decision's partial
list of protected governmental functions' 86 the UTU court focused on
the "integral" rather than the "traditional" component of the Supreme
Court's formulations 187 and, in so doing, articulated a working definition which can be applied in determining whether a particular state
activity is entitled to protection from federal regulation enacted under
129. 634 F.2d at 27-29. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text supra.
130. See 426 U.S. at 851 n.16. Although National League of Cities excluded interstate freight railroads from the core of protected governmental
functions, the Court noted that its list of integral functions was not exhaustive,
thus allowing for the possibility that numerous other governmental services,
such as commuter rail service, might be immune from federal regulation under
the commerce clause. See id. Whereas the State Belt Rail Road disapproved
of in United States v. California incidentally benefited the general public
through the earmarking of all profits for harbor improvements, the LIRR is
primarily a public service rather than commercial railroad. See note 1 & 2 and
accompanying text supra. That the two species of rail service are fundamentally different is,it is submitted, a conclusion which cannot be ignored.
For a discussion of the importance of mass transportation to an urban community, see notes 109-113 and accompanying text supra.
131. See 426 U.S. at 847. It is submitted that the National League of
Cities Court's numerous references to services which a citizenry requires, presume an organic theory of state sovereignty that recognizes Chief Justice
Marshall's oft-quoted dictum: "[I]n considering this question, then, we must
never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (emphasis in original). As Justice Marshall
recognized over 150 years ago that the Constitution ought not be limited by
the static confines of a legal code or one era's perceptions of governmental
responsibility, so too, it is submitted, the UTU court was correct in declining
to accord integral governmental function status to only those services or activities which the states have historically provided for their citizens.
132. See notes 130 & 131 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted
that the Supreme Court's imprecise delineation of the integral governmental
function standard may in fact have been an indication of its unwillingness to
limit itself or the states to a fixed concept of governmental responsibility.
Given the political climate under the presidency of Ronald Reagan, however,
the vitality of this submission may be undermined as the federal government
returns responsibility for a wide variety of public services to the private sector.
See note 145 infra.
133. 634 F.2d at 27-28. See notes 112-13 and accompanying text supra.
134. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
135. See id.
136. For courts focusing on the latter component, see cases cited in note

86 supra.
137. See note 67 supra.
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the commerce clause. 138 By measuring the sovereignty of state functions
against the public need and the harm which might result from an interruption or termination of the service in question, 139 it is contended that
the UTU court articulated a standard which avoids a static catalogue
of state provided services which are immune from restrictive federal
legislation under National League of Cities.140

Therefore, it is sub-

mitted that the UTU court's conclusion that integral governmental
functions need not be ones which have historically been provided by
41
government is within the ambit of National League of Cities.'

138. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text supra.
139. See note 115 and accompanying text supra.
140. See note 86 supra.

141. In the words of one commentator cited by the UTU court, "[a]s the
-problems faced by urban governments evolve, so will the citizenry's expectations of what are appropriate governmental services. Just as hospitals went
from being accountable under federal regulations to a status of immunity,
-electric utilities may someday, in certain regions, provide an integral govern-ment function." Status of State Sovereignty, supra note 84, at 332 (footnote
-omitted). For an 'excellent discussion of the future of commuter rail transportation, see generally Kemp & Cheslow, Urban Transportation Problems and
Perspectives, 2 TRANSIT L. REV. 33 (1979) (hereinafter cited as Problems and
Perspectives).
Viewing National League of Cities as an affirmative expression of state

sovereignty, Professor Tribe has argued that inherent in the Court's recognition
of integral governmental functions is the right of the citizen to demand that
government provide such services. See Tribe supra note 69, at 1072. According to Tribe:
The Court's problematic distinction between essential and nonessential
governmental functions therefore turns out to depend on the fact
that certain governmental functions exist to serve legitimate claims
that citizens may make on their government. Whether the distinction
is formulated in terms of "essential" and "nonessential" functions
• . . the holding of National League of Cities suggests that a line is
being drawn between services that a governmental unit delivers in
fulfillment of claims of right of its citizens and those it delivers for a
price simply to meet their desire . . . . It is because the states have
a duty to meet such claims of right, a duty not shared by private
parties, that "the States as States stand on a quite different footing
than an individual or a corporation when challenging the exercise of
Congress' power to regulate commerce."
Id. at n.42, quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854
(1976). Given the UTU court's recognition that the LIRR has an uncertain
financial future, it is questionable whether citizens could demand that the state
fund the transit system entirely out of tax revenues, in much the same way as
it provides such integral governmental functions as police and fire protection.
See also Michelman, supra note 69, at 1182-83, 1186-87.
It is suggested that the fact that the state imposes a charge on the use of a
public service should not in and of itself be fatal to the determination of that
service's integral governmental character. Where the state is forced by the
increasing economic elimination of private enterprise to assume responsibility
of an important public service, the financial reality of the service cannot be
discounted. Although citizens do not ordinarily pay for police or fire protection each time the service is utilized, patients at state operated hospitals

share the cost of medical care despite the fact that hospitals are integral govern-
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Furthermore, it is submitted that the reasoning of the UTU court.
adheres more closely to National League of Cities than the other courts
which have similarly invalidated federal legislation. 142 First, by recogmental functions. See note 77 supra. For a particularly thorough review of
the issue presented by requiring the user to support the provision of urban
mass transportation in the context of an integral function claim, see Alewine v.
City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981). See generally Problems and'
Perspectives, supra note 141, at 43-44.
142. See, e.g., Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n Inc. v. Andrus,
483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980), rev'd sub nom., Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclam. Ass'n Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981); Amersbach v. City. of
Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). See notes 88 & 90 and accompanying
text supra. It is submitted that the operation of a municipal airport, as considered in Amersbach, is not sufficiently akin to such integral functions as
police and fire protection, since its primary purpose is to facilitate the nation's
air transportation system, rather than to satisfy primarily local needs. Moreover, the predominance of the federal interest in air transportation greatly
exceeds its interest in intrastate commuter rail service, even if one does not
discount the LIRR's minimal effect on interstate commerce. See notes 3 & 15
supra. Compare Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 446-47 (1978),
(discussing substantial investment by federal government in the development
of local airports) with Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1601(b)(l) (1976) (purpose of legislation "to assist in the development of
• . . mass transportation facilities . . . both public and private") (emphasis.
added).
Similarly, Congress explicitly provided that the primary responsibility under
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (under consideration
in Virginia Surface Mining, see note 90 supra) should remain with the states,.
and denied any intention of pre-empting the states from enacting more stringent.
requirements. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201(f), 1225 (1976). Furthermore, and contrary to the states' challenges to the regulations, the Act does not require the
expenditure of state funds, or that the state participate at all in the federalscheme. See 30 U.S.C. § 1235 (1976). As the Supreme Court has recently
noted:
If a State does not wish to submit a proposed program that complies
with the Act and implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden
will be borne by the Federal Government. Thus, there can be no
suggestion that the Act comandeers the legislative processes of the
States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program. . . .
The most that can be said is that the Surface
Mining Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism that allows
the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards, to
enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to
meet their own particular needs.
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2376
(1981) (footnotes and citations omitted). Cf. United States v. Helsley, 615 F.2d
784 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding the Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U.S.C. § 742(j)-(1)
(1976); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 224-28 (4th Cir. 1977), vacated and
remanded sub nom., EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (per curiam) (vacating
judgments of federal actions which invalidated state implementation provisions
of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1976), despite EPA concession
of error in drafting regulations); Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Carey, 522 F.2d 25,
36-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) (upholding the Clean Air Act);
Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114, 1140 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 959
(1977) (upholding the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1976)). See
also United States v. Ohio Dept. of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir.
1980) (federal interest in controlling air pollution exceeds state interest in
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nizing that the Supreme Court's decision involved the provision of
public services, the UTU court avoided the possibility that any legitimate state interest could be entitled to tenth amendment immunity
from the exercise of congressional power. 148 Second, and more importantly, deference of the UTU court to a potential overriding federal
interest adequately ensures the national legislature's needed input into
the diagnosis and solution of the nation's domestic problems.144 In this
allowing noncomplying vehicles to use state's streets and highways; legislation
not impermissible intrusion into state's integral governmental functions since
EPA does not seek to displace state's system of motor vehicle licensing, registration or highway access).
143. See Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n Inc. v. Andrus, 483 F.
Supp. 425, 430 (W.D. Va. 1980) rev'd sub nor., Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclam. Ass'n Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981) discussed at note 80 supra.
Although the Supreme Court did not have occasion to determine whether the
state's interest in regulating land use is an integral governmental function in
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, it is submitted that the
district court's opinion in Andrus was incorrect in stating that "[s]tate regulation of land use ... [though] in a different category than ... [National League
of Cities' enumerated] activities, not being a service per se . . .also 'provides an
integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally afforded their citizens.'" 483 F. Supp. at
433, citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976). See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &:Reclam. Ass'n Inc., 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2366
(1981) (finding the state's interest in land use to be secondary to the applicability of federal strip mining regulation of private surface coal miners).
144. It is submitted that the UTU court was correct in reaffirming the
Second Circuit's adoption of Justice Blackmun's balancing test. See 634 F.2d
at 29, citing Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 37-38 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). By looking beyond the character of the governmental function, it is submitted that the balancing approach has the advantages of 1) providing more explicit protection against analysis in terms of the
interests of local government, and 2) reconciling the resurrection of the tenth
amendment limitation on the power of the federal government with the Court's
long-standing willingness to allow Congress to regulate all activities which even
remotely affect interstate commerce. See notes 41-46 and accompanying text
supra. While this approach may be seen as a disguised threat to state sovereignty (i.e., the ability of the states to function as separate and independent
entities without federal intervention), there are limitations within the political system which limit Congress' ability to act in total disregard of the
states' interests. See Wells & Hellerstein, The Government-Proprietary Distinction, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1980). Because each member of Congress has a stake in protecting the interests of the state which he represents,
and because each state is well represented in Congress, there is an inherent
political check on the possible enactment of federal legislation without the
giving of due consideration to state sovereignty concerns. See id. It is to
assure similar representation of the interests of the federal government in the
state legislatures that the balancing approach is most useful. Id. For an
extensive discussion of the protection which the national political system
affords state's rights, see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & M. WESCHLER,
HART & WESCHLER: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 470-71
(2d ed. 1973); Weschler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The notion that the national political system
protects states from abuses of their sovereign status has been criticized in circumstances where a particular state's interest is not shared by other states
because of peculiarly local conditions or problems. See Note, supra note 69,
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way, it is submitted, the 1980s will benefit from a federal system that
returns a significant portion of government to the states without a total
disregard of the national legislative machinery. 45
It is submitted, however, that the Second Circuit's application of
the state sovereignty doctrine suffers from several shortcomings. First,
it is suggested that, contrary to the UTU court's interpretation, the
National League of Cities Court could not have intended that the states
be exempt from federal regulation which contravenes any of its legislatively determined policy decisions. 14 To be sure, judicial enforcement
of the RLA's self-help provisions would interfere with the decision by
New York legislator to prohibit strikes by public employees. However,
it is questionable, as the UTU court apparently recognized, 47 whether
such a broad based labor policy as that found in the Taylor Law is
indeed essential to the state's "separate and independent existence." 148
at 1885 (1976). For other commentary questioning the adequacy of state
representation in Congress, see generally Kaden, Politics, Money and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 857-68 (1979); see
also Tribe, supra note 69, at 1071-72; Bogen, supra note 63, at 760-63.
145. Consider the current political climate as expressed in the Inaugural
Address of President Ronald Reagan, delivered on January 20, 1981:
It is time to check and reverse the growth of government which shows
signs of having grown beyond the consent of the governed.
It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the Federal
establishment and to demand recognition of the distinction between
the powers granted to the Federal Government and those reserved
to the States or to the people. All of us need to be reminded that
the Federal Government did not create the States; the States created
the Federal Government.

President's Inaugural Address, 17

WEEKLY COMP. OF

1981).

PREs. Doc. 1, 2 (Jan. 26,

But, as President Reagan continued:
. Now, so there will be no misunderstanding, it's not my intention to do away with government. It is rather to make it work work with us, not over us; to stand by our side, not ride our back.
Government can and must provide opportunity, not smother it;
foster productivity, not stifle it.
Id. at 3.
146. See note 104 and accompanying text supra; notes 162-63 and accompanying text infra. As one commentator has recognized, the fact is that
every decision by government officials can in some way be characterized as
an "essential government decision" merely by virtue of the fact that it has
been legislatively determined. See Tushnet, supra note 80, at 1340. It
should be noted, however, that Professor Tushnet's point is equally applicable
to, and was in fact made by him in a criticism of, National League of Cities.
See id. and note 82 supra.
147. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
148. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.

Initially, it is sub-

mitted that the UTU court may have misread the focal point of National
League of Cities since that decision held that only decisions by the State to
provide integral governmental functions were "essential government decisions;" it did not assign such status to policy determinations and only then
turned to the question of integrality. Contrary to the UTU court's determina-
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Secondly, it is submitted that the UTU court's use of public need
150
The
or support as a measure of integrality 14 is open to criticism.
law
case
of
body
substantial
a
court made little attempt to distinguish
to,
value
of
terms
in
analysis
which it recognized as militating against
151
result
overall
court's
the
More significantly, while
the community.
tion, it is because a particular decision by state legislators is found to implicate an integral governmental function that it is deemed "essential;" thus, it
is submitted, the UTU court may have initially accorded too great a significance to the policy behind the Taylor Law. But see Bogen, supra note 63,.
at 766 (arguing that essential decisions are distinct from the determination of
whether governmental functions are integral).
Furthermore, because the Taylor Law applies equally to all aspects of
state government, see note 102 supra, it is difficult to hypothesize the precise
effect which interruption of commuter mass transit will have, not upon the
citizens of New York, but rather on the "States as States" and the state's.
ability to "function effectively within the federal system." See 426 U.S. at
852, quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 n.7 (1975). Since the National League of Cities decision spoke in terms of the state's ability to provide rather than the recipient's ability to do without a particular governmental benefit, this distinction may be more important than the UTU court
realized. See 426 U.S. at 837, 839, 841, 845, 847, 849, 851-52. But see Commuter Rail Transportation, supra note 84, at 175 (approving of UTU's addition of a community wide impact test in assessing the integrality of a governmental function).
Although the UTU court focused primarily on the adverse effects which
interruption of a potentially integral governmental service would have on the
community at large, it is submitted that the court might have brought its.
reasoning within the rationale of National League of Cities had it instead
focused on the consequences which compliance with the RLA would have
occasioned for the state government. See note 78 and accompanying text.
supra. For example, the National League of Cities Court found that compliance with the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
impermissibly interferred with state sovereignty since compliance with its.
provisions, in view of a limited amount of state tax revenues, would require
that the state attempt to increase their revenues "or reduce [the] compliment
[of public service employees] to a number which can be paid the federal
minimum wage without increasing revenues." 426 U.S. at 848. Like the
Supreme Court, Judge Sweet might have more fully considered whether a demand for higher wages coupled with a threatened strike could have had a
similar effect in requiring the state to reduce the number of LIRR employees.
in order to meet the financial burden, thereby decreasing public safety and
more directly implicating one of National League of Cities' enumerated integral
governmental functions. See 426 U.S. at 848, 851 n.16 (police protection);
note 104 and accompanying text supra.
149. See notes 109-13 and accompanying text supra.
150. See notes 151-58 and accompanying text infra.
151. 634 F.2d at 27-28. See note 112 and accompanying text supra. It
is suggested that, even if decisions construing the essentiality test within theareas of state action and National Labor Relations Act policy are not wholly
applicable to the issue of whether the RLA interferes with an integral governmental function, the UTU decision could have benefitted from a concientious effort to address their implications. See Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth. 100 L.R.R.M.
at 3159-61 (discussing incapability of distinguishing Supreme Court's prior
decisions finding that the importance of a public benefit is irrelevant in
evaluating right to strike under the NLRA). Moreover, it is suggested,
that the Supreme Court's decision in Division 1287 Amalgamated Ass'n of
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is not disputed, its conclusion suffers from a failure to analyze commuter
rail transportation in terms of the four-prong test enunciated by the
Amersbach court 152 and incorporated, by implication, into its own reasoning. 153 For example, the court neglects the fact that the riding public
pays a small yet direct portion of the expense of the service which the
state has decided to provide.154 The court similarly discounts the admittedly significant amount of freight which the LIRR carries, although it
offers no support or explanation for such a selective reading of the
relevant facts. 155

Street, Elec. Ry. and Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74 (1963)
may be read as directly contradicting the UTU court's observation that, in
determining whether an employee is performing an integral governmental
function, a court should consider whether interuption of that service would
cause a great harm to the community. See 374 U.S. at 76. In invalidating
a state statute which authorized the governor of Missouri to seize and operate
a public utility when its operation would be threatened by a labor strike, the
Court stated that such a seizure could not be justified by "a proclamation
that the public interest, health and welfare [are] jeopardized by the threatened
interruption of the company's operations .... ." Id. Although the decision
in Division 1287 acknowledged that the NLRA explicitly guaranteed
the right to strike, a right contravened by the state statute, in view of the
Supreme Court's finding that the right to strike is implicit in the RLA's collective bargaining scheme, it is submitted that the Supreme Court's precedent
may be instructive in the instant decision. Id. at 82, citing Amalgamated
Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Wisconsin Employ.
Rel. Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951). See also Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378-82 (1969). However, it is
submitted that the UTU court might have distinguished this precedent simply
on the basis that they preceeded the Court's abrupt break with forty years
,of constitutional doctrine in National League of Cities coupled with the
Court's failure to address the public function analysis in Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See notes 41-42 & 84 and accompanying text supra.
152. See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
153. 634 F.2d at 26-27. See note 113 supra. The UTU court referred
to the Amersbach decision on at least four occasions. See 634 F.2d at 26, 27,
28 & n.26.
154. At least one post-UTU court has stated that the existence of a user
fare actually runs counter to the Amersbach criteria that the governmental
service be available to the public at "little or no direct expense." Alewine v.
City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981), citing UTU v. LIRR, 634
F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1980); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th
Cir. 1979). In Alewine, the court noted that, unlike Amersbach's operation
of a municipal airport, the operation of a city bus system required that the
riding public pay the city to use the governmentally provided service. 505
F. Supp. at 889. Users of the Cleveland airport were not so required and,
in fact, only paid the airlines for the service which they utilized. See 598
F.2d at 1036. See also Crashing on Take-Off, supra note 81, at 834-35 & n.49.
However, the Alewine court did not consider this prong of the Amersbach
criteria to be dispositive. 505 F. Supp. at 889. It is suggested that the UTU
court neglected this important issue since several commentators, upon examining the enumerated activities in National League of Cities, have questioned
whether the provision of an individually financed service can constitute an
integral governmental function. See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 69, at 1182-83.
155. See notes 122-24 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested
that because the district court determined that the LIRR supplies a "critical
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It is further contended that the court's limitation of integral function status to activities which are largely unavailable in the private sector, 156 is inconsistent with dictum in National League of Cities which

impliedly assigns such status to governmental functions both traditionally
and currently available in the market place. 15 7 In view of the increasing
social expectations and demands being placed on government, it is suggested that the court, in focusing on those services which are economically
unsuitable as profit making enterprises, narrowed the discretion available to the states under National League of Cities. Because increased
public demand, legislative experimentation and/or worsening economic
conditions may necessitate a state's involvement in the provision of a
service, it is contended that the UTU court may have unwisely harnessed
its rule to an economic factor which, although significant, is only one
relevant consideration in an assessment of the state's governmental
responsibilities.' 58
link" in the nation's system of interstate commerce, the Second Circuit should
have explained why this conclusion was downplayed on appeal. Compare
634 F.2d at 29-30 with UTU v. LIRR, 509 F. Supp. at 1304. It is significant that the UTU court admitted that the LIRR derived approximately
20% of its total revenues from its freight operations. 634 F.2d at 30. While
the UTU court argued that this figure showed that the state interest in com-

muter rail service predominates over the federal interest in interstate commerce, it is submitted, as one court had previously recognized that "[n]ot a
single authority has been cited . . .which even suggests that we should engage
in a quantitative analysis, debilitating the [RLA] in some proportionate meastire as the connection with interstate commerce decreases." Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng'rs v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Auth., 100
L.R.R.M. at 3160-61 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1979) (cited in UTU v. LIRR, 509 F.
Supp. at 1306).

156. See notes 114-15 and accompanying text supra.
157. See 426 U.S. at 855. The Supreme Court impliedly included the

operation of hospitals and schools within the core of protected governmental
functions when it overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). See
426 U.S. at 855 & note 77 supra. This observation is doubly puzzling, it is
submitted, because contrary to both National League of Cities and UTU,
the services provided by state schools and hospitals have been traditionally,
and continue to be, available from private sources in the market place. See
426 U.S. at 855; 634 F.2d at 29.
158. See Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Man.dating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J.
1196, 1234-35 (1977); Tushnet, supra note 80, at 1339-40. Both commentators

reason that the historical function criterion implicit in National League of
Cities is convoluted, since it denies exemption from federal regulation to
modern innovations with which the states are experimenting and seeking
new solutions to even newer problems. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 80,
.at 1339-40, citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (states satisfy prime value of a federal system by
providing laboratories of social experimentation). If, in the formulation of
the "availability in the marketplace" test for gauging the integrality of a
particular state function, the UTU court intended to supplant the historical
perspective implicit in National League of Cities, the UTU rationale will

expand protection only to those activities which economic circumstances
demand that the state assume. If, instead, the UTU decision can be read

as grafting a fluid standard onto that expressed therein, it is submitted that
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Finally, it is submitted that the evidence is insufficient 159 to support
the UTU court's finding that the federal interest in uninterrupted interstate commerce is not "demonstrably greater" than the state's interest
in prohibiting strikes by public employees. 160 In reaching its decision,
the UTU court relied upon its prior finding that the RLA "eliminates.
a key provision in the state's legislative effort to provide its citizens with
continuous public transportation." 11 It bears repetition to note, however, that, because the state's interest in continuous rail service derives.
from the general policy on governmental operations, 62 it cannot be said.
with certainty that the Taylor Law reflects the particular state interest
in commuter mass transit. 163 In addition, absent an analysis of why theright to strike is integral to the federal government's interests in an orderly system of interstate commerce, it is difficult, it is submitted, to see
how the UTU court was able to justify its conclusion that the contrary
policy of the Taylor Law was not only equal to but served that samefederal interest. 64 Given the UTU court's inconsistent treatment of the
this extension will permit greater maneuverability for the states, especially
during periods when the economic future of a popular public service is.
critical, but not crucial. See Michelman, supra note 69, at 1168-73.
159. See notes 15 & 124 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 120-24 and accompanying text supra.
161. 634 F.d at 25.

See note 101 and accompanying text supra.

162. See note 102 and accompanying text supra.
163. See note 148 and accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 121-23 and accompanying text supra. Although the UTUcourt attempted to distinguish California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957),
by pointing out that in Taylor the state statute was "antithetical" to the
federal system of collective bargaining under the RLA, it is submitted that
this observation is askew. First, the interest at issue in UTU is not whetherthe Taylor Law abrogates the whole of the RLA as applied to public employees; it is, rather, whether the right to strike is impeded. More importantly
is dictum in California v Taylor which indicates that although the railroad
employees were prohibited under state law from engaging in strikes, this.
"reduce[d], but does not eliminate, the possibility of a work stoppage." California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. at 566. It is submitted that the incidence in past
years of strikes by LIRR employees and other public employees, such as
members of PATCO, the union representing air traffic controllers who violated
federal law by going out on strike in August, 1981, indicates that state laws.
serve only to deter rather than precludes strikes by public employees. Whether
Justice Blackmun intended that a state policy of this nature could equal or
exceed such a clearly defined and judicially recognized policy as the federal
government's interest in interstate commerce is, of course, open to seriousquestion.
Furthermore, despite the fact that the right to strike is not explicitly
provided for in the RLA, the Supreme Court has stated that the right is.
"integral" to the legislation. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. at 378-82. While the UTU court may have
benefitted by questioning the amount of federal interest in a policy not explicit in the RLA, and possibly based on considerations of general labor
law, it is submitted that this argument would have been unavailing. See
Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (absence of Congres-
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LIRR's involvement in interstate commerce, it is submitted that its
65
weighing of interests lacks support.
In considering the impact of UTU, it is submitted that the decision is likely to have perplexing implications for the federal system as
courts address claims that federal legislation interferes with an integral
aspect of state sovereignty. 66 It is possible that if UTU's analysis is
echoed by other courts, 167 the concept of integral governmental functions
will come to be fractionalized as states in different regions assume as
governmental services activities which, because of purely local conditions,
require state governmental support. 68 Whereas rail service may be
integral to all metropolitan areas, water supply may only be as integral
to Los Angeles as electric service is to rural Texas. 09
It is submitted that in light of the potential rivalries and inconsistent results if similar governmental functions are deemed integral in
some but not all other regions, the Supreme Court may feel pressured to
rearticulate its holding in National League of Cities. Ultimately, the
UTU reasoning, it is suggested, may precipitate the Court's restriction
.of the integral governmental function test to activities which have historically and universally been assumed by the states.1 70 The promulgasional statement that the federal labor statutes are intended to preempt state
law irrelevant where state law would frustrate federal scheme).
165. Compare 634 F.2d at 23 with 634 F.2d at 29-30. See note and accompanying text supra.
166. Because the concept of sovereign immunity from commerce clause
regulation was not judicially recognized prior to 1976, at least two courts have
recognized that this area of constitutional law is uncertain. See 634 F.2d at
.30; Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880, 887 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
167. See, e.g., Alewine v. City Council, 505 F. Supp. 880 (S.D. Ga. 1981).

168. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 591 (1946) (Douglas,
dissenting) (the ownership or operation of a railroad, mill, or an irriga.
tion system may be deemed, in certain regions, as essential as the operation of
bridges, street lights, or a sewage system). But see United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (state law impairing state obligation uncon.stitutional despite claim that action was reasonable in order to protect public's
newly developed interest in mass transportation systems); Helvering v. Ger.
hardt, 304 U.S. 405 (1938) (state ownership of public corporation created to
operate various bridges and tunnels as well as an interstate busline and a
terminal for interchanges of freight between trucks and railroads not en.titled to intergovernmental immunity from federal taxation since facility is
not "a function essential to the continued existence of the state government").
See generally Status of State Sovereignty, supra note 84, at 311. See also
.Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1125, 1129.
169. Acknowledging this possibility, at least one set of commentators
has argued that National League of Cities be interpreted as suggesting a traditional rather than integral governmental function test for determining state
-sovereignty, reasoning that clear guidelines are more advantageous than
flexible ones. Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 144, at 1102-05
170. Two recent decisions by the Supreme Court disposed of claims that
federal strip mining regulation interfered with the states' traditional govern-mental functions of regulating land use. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
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tion, on the other hand, of a specific test for delimiting state sovereignty
in a way which is as sensitive to the origins of the essentiality standard
as it is to the complex constitutional history leading up to National
League of Cities,17 ' will more than likely foster a revitalized spirit to
what Justice Black has referred to as "Our Federalism." 172
ing & Reclam. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981); Hodel v. Indiana, 101 S. Ct.
2376 (1981). Because the strip mining legislation regulated only the activities of surface mine operators who are private individuals and businesses,
the Court found no violation of the tenth amendment as these provisions
did not regulate the "States as States." 101 S. Ct. at 2366-67; 101 S. Ct. at
2385-86.
171. Compare Commuter Rail Transporation, supra note 84 at 155-59 and
notes 47 & 54 supra with notes 16-92 and accompanying text supra.
172. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). It should be noted that

the Court's opinions in the strip mining regulation cases enumerated a three

prong test for determining whether federal commerce clause regulation
Breaking
See 101 S. Ct. at 2366.
violates the tenth amendment.
National League of Cities into its components, the Court stated that
there must first be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the
Id., citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
"States as States."
U.S. at 854. Secondly, the federal regulation must address matters that are
101 S. Ct. at 2366, citing
"indisputably 'attributes of state sovereignty'."
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 845. Lastly, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal law would directly impair
their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions.'"
101 S.Ct. at 2366, citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852.
Despite this test, it is submitted that it not only offers no guidance but confuses the issue involved in UTU. Although the RLA does not by its own
terms apply to the states, as did the FLSA in National League of Cities, seenote 68 supra, because compliance with the RLA directly contradicts a state
policy determination to prohibit strikes, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
will resolve UTU as it did the strip mining cases by merely holding that
the regulation does not affect the "States as States." See 101 S. Ct. at 2366-

67 and note 170 supra. The difficulty with the second and third prongs of the
test is the Court's heretofore unannounced requirement that federal regulation address an "indisputable" attribute of state sovereignty. Coupled with the
third prong's seemingly inconsistent use of the terms "integral" and "tradi-

tional," the Court has confounded the standard for determining precisely
which governmental functions are immune from federal commerce clause
regulation. Compare 426 U.S. at 845; note 68 and accompanying text supra
with 426 U.S. at 845 ("We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes
of sovereignty attaching for every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress . . .") (emphasis added). See also notes 84-89
and accompanying text supra. If the Court, as apparently is the case,
intends only to sustain tenth amendment challenges to attributes which

are generic to all state governments, then it would appear that the

reasoning in UTU will be rejected since the underlying thesis of Judge
Sweet's opinion was the inability of New York private enterprise to successfully provide commuter rail service to the metropolitan area. See notes 109-13
and accompanying text supra. Unless the Supreme Court is willing to take

judicial notice of the fact that commuter rail transportation has, as UTU
noted, come "to be supplied primarily by state and local governments," it
cannot be said with certainty that the provision of this service will be deemed
an indisputable governmental function. Because the Court in both strip
mining decisions did not specifically address the second and third prongs of
its tenth amendment test, resolution of this issue will turn on whether the
Court directly confronts it in UTU or, as may also be likely, whether it determines to avoid the semantical problems by evaluating the nature of the
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In conclusion, it is submitted that UTU illustrates the complexities
of commerce clause regulation which is directed at the states and their
political subdivisions. In addition to highlighting the tension between
the national government - whose responsibility encompasses national
problems - and the states - who are more directly responsible for the
safety and well-being of their citizens - the UTU decision points out
the changing roles which may make application of traditional or historical perceptions of government power inappropriate. Though a sensitive interpretation of the tenth amendment and National League of
Cities, the possibility of inconsistent applications of federal law to domestic affairs mandates eludication by the Supreme Court. If not constitutionally required, the current political shift under Ronald Reagan 173
may make such a determination an essential guidepost as states begin to
assume both financial and governmental responsibility over the needs
of the modem electorate.
Stuart K. Fleischmann
federal interest involved in the RLA so as to justify state submission. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. at 2366 n.29,
citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
173. See note 145 supra.
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